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Energy is one of the most relevant factors for economic growth, which is the main cause 
of CO2 emissions. Currently, CO2 accounts for 90% of emissions associated with 
human-induced climate change. Additionally, the potential economic impact of climate 
change could reduce annual global GDP between 5-20%, while the mitigation of climate 
change would cost only 1% of global GDP. In response, an increasing number of 
jurisdictions have implemented carbon-pricing mechanisms (i.e., carbon taxes and cap-
and-trade systems) to reduce emissions, which covers 20% of the GHG global 
emissions. Under the Paris Agreement, 88 jurisdictions plan to use carbon-pricing 
mechanisms to achieve their 2030 target emissions reductions.  
The gold standard for carbon pricing policymakers is to achieve the highest emissions 
reductions and to cause the least negative impacts on economic growth. Moreover, 
culture is deemed to play a critical role in shaping climate policies and enabling their 
successful implementation.  
This study examined 49 jurisdictions at the national and the subnational level, using 
multiple regression analysis and moderation analysis to assess the impacts of carbon 
pricing on economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions, and the moderating effect of 
cultural distances on carbon prices. The study utilized the Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions framework to measure culture in the jurisdictions.  
Results revealed that carbon prices and cultural dimensions were able to explain 
between 1.5% and 67.3% of the variance in the GDP growth rate, with uncertainty 
avoidance and the interaction between carbon prices and uncertainty avoidance as the 
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strongest significant predictors. With respect to the CO2 emissions, carbon prices and 
cultural dimensions were able to explain between 5.5% and 29.2% of the variance in the 
carbon dioxide emissions growth rate, where individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty 
avoidance emerged as the strongest significant explanatory variables. 
Consideration of culture as relevant factors in the development of carbon-pricing 
instruments is an important step in enhancing the chances of a successful 
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The Climate Change agreement reached in Paris in 2015 was a political achievement. 
Nevertheless, its environmental impacts are less clear. If the agreement is fully 
implemented, current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat 
leaves the global emissions reductions targets as insufficient efforts to keep the world 
on track to limit temperature rise to 1.5 °C by 2030, the goal stated in the Accord 
(Dolphin, Pollitt, & Newbery, 2016). To meet the goals established in the Paris 
Agreement, jurisdictions need to increase their efforts to reduce emissions.  None of the 
critical investments will be possible unless policies include incentives for change, by 
removing subsidies to fossil fuels, implementing carbon-pricing initiatives, increasing 
energy efficiency standards, developing auctions for lowest costs renewable energy 
(World Bank, Ecofys, & Vivid Economics, 2017), and considering the particular 
conditions and the social responses to climate change of the jurisdictions, such as 
cultural values.  
In September 2014, more than 1,000 companies, including large oil and gas companies, 
signed the World Bank’s Put a Price on Carbon Statement. Many firms, including 
ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and BP, have expressed a preference for carbon-
pricing policies in lieu of regulatory approaches (Narassimhan, Gallagher, Koester, & 




At the present time, more than 30 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide per year are 
emitted globally from the combustion of fossil fuels(Newell, Pizer, & Raimi, 2013). 
Currently, the relationship between emissions and economic development is at the 
centre of debate on the appropriate policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
The need for urgent action regarding climate change is emphasized in the formulation of 
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), while the Paris Climate Conference 
(CoP21, December 2015) stressed the importance of expanding the geographic scope 
of action. By 2016, 195 developed and developing countries adopted the 
aforementioned Paris Agreement and established reduction targets for 2030, among 
them the United States of America (Fernández-Amador, Francois, Oberdabernig, & 
Tomberger, 2017).  
In June 2017, the U.S. government and the Trump Administration decided to walk away 
from the Paris Accord, claiming that it will “undermine the country’s economy” and that it 
“puts the U.S. at a permanent economic disadvantage” (Garden, 2017, para. 2). 
The most relevant drivers that influence the growth rate of CO2 emissions depends 
mainly on three factors: economic activity (derived from the use of fossil fuels), the 
carbon intensity of the economies, and the functioning of unexploited carbon sources 
and sinks on land and in the oceans (Canadell et al., 2007); the first two factors are 
those directly related to energy consumption. Currently, 90% of the CO2 emissions 
originate from fossil-fuel combustion and are determined by the energy consumption or 
the level of energy-intensive activity (Le Quéré et al., 2013). However, changes in 
energy efficiency and in the fuel mix, especially from carbon-intensive sources such as 
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coal to low-carbon ones or from fossil fuels to renewable energies, can cut the overall 
global emissions level (Bekhet, Matar, & Yasmin, 2017). 
Climate change policies address these externalities’ impact in one of three ways: a) 
require businesses and individuals to change behaviour towards technology adoption 
and emissions; b) subsidize businesses and individuals to invest in low-carbon services 
and goods; or c) put a price to externalities caused by greenhouse-gas emissions (Aldy 
& Stavins, 2011) 
During the last ten years, carbon-pricing instruments, such as cap-and-trade systems 
and carbon tax have been widely implemented as effective financial instruments to 
reduce emissions in several jurisdictions. As of 2018, 45 national and 25 subnational 
jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon using these instruments. Carbon-pricing 
schemes implemented and scheduled for implementation would cover 11 gigatons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e), or about 20 percent of global GHG emissions, 
compared to 8 GtCO2e or about 15 percent in 2017. This increase is primarily due to 
the expected coverage of the China national Emission Trading System (World Bank & 
Ecofys, 2018). 
The gold standard of climate change and carbon pricing policymakers is to achieve the 
highest emissions reductions and to cause the least negative impacts on economic 
growth. These two particular features of carbon-pricing instruments enhance 
substantially the political acceptability of climate policies. Moreover, policymaking is also 
affected by cultural values, which in turn, also improve policy acceptability and 
implementation. In this regard, authors claim that a better understanding of invisible 
cultural differences is one of the main contributions the social sciences can make to 
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practical policymakers in governments, organizations and institutions, and to ordinary 
citizens (Disli, Ng, & Askari, 2016; Hofstede, 1980; Husted, 2005) 
Developing resilience adapt to climate change is also about managing risks, either in 
reaction to or in anticipation of changes arising from changing weather and climate. 
Policy on mitigation has largely focused on the physical aspects of climate change, 
including risks to ecosystems and lives, the costs of decarbonizing economies, and the 
costs of impacts on various sectors of the economy. These are, for the most part, 
quantifiable and therefore conventionally included in policy analyses. No less important, 
however, are the cultural dimensions of climate change (Adger, Barnett, Brown, 
Marshall, & O’Brien, 2013).  
These insights into how culture interacts with climate-related risks could radically alter 
understanding of social responses to climate change, and affect how mitigation and 
adaptation policies are designed. Most areas of public policy seek to promote societal 
goals through efficient policy mechanisms. Nevertheless, there is evidence that current 
climate change policies, overlooking culture, lead to undesired outcomes (Adger et al., 
2013), which is one of the goals that this research seeks to explore.  Therefore, this 
study’s objective is to identify relevant cultural aspects that affect climate policies and 
explain the potential impacts of carbon-pricing instruments on economic indicators and 
emissions reductions by incorporating the cultural dimensions and its moderating 
influence on carbon prices to achieve effective emission reductions.  
1.2. Problem statement 
According to Vogel and Kun (1987), the public policy choices of a country are 
significantly influenced by culture. This influence of culture on a myriad of policy 
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topics—education, wealth distribution, government oversight—is very well described in 
the literature, but the extent to which cultural values shape environmental and climate 
policy is not well documented (Waas, 2014). The literature that relates climate policy to 
culture is scarce, and non-existent in the case of carbon pricing, which is the gap that 
this study attempts to fill. Moreover, there is emerging evidence that climate policies, at 
least in specific cases, partly by neglecting cultural dimensions of climate change, have 
led to maladaptive results (Adger et al., 2013). 
The relevance of culture in climate-change policymaking is essential, due to the fact that 
national culture is a total system of different values, beliefs, and perceptions among the 
countries (Hofstede, 1980). Thus, culture's influence may lead to the implementation of 
different environmental policies and affect countries' environmental performance. 
On the other hand, over the past decade, the number of carbon-pricing initiatives has 
doubled, mainly in the form of carbon taxes and emission trading systems (ETS). During 
that same period, emissions covered have increased almost fourfold. The number of 
carbon-pricing initiatives will continue to grow, with several new initiatives under 
consideration and some of them planning to link jurisdictions, which increasingly 
requires taking into consideration cultural values.  
The entry into force of the Paris Agreement in 2016, reaffirmed countries’ commitment 
to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and several of them stated in their Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) that they are considering the use of carbon-pricing 
schemes (World Bank et al., 2017). In addition, as described before, two of the major 
concerns of policymakers during the development of carbon-pricing measures, are the 
potentially detrimental impacts on economic growth and the effectiveness of carbon-
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pricing schemes in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The present study analyzed 
the aforementioned concerns by employing the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
framework to assess the moderating effect of culture on carbon pricing and the 
influence of carbon pricing on economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions.  
Due to the increasing relevance of carbon pricing as a financial instrument to reduce 
emissions, understanding how cultural values shape climate policies is essential to 
assure the successful implementation and adoption of carbon-pricing initiatives, both at 
the national and the subnational level.    
1.3. Research question and objective 
1.3.1. Research question 
▪ What is the effect of culture and carbon pricing on economic growth and carbon 
dioxide emissions? 
1.3.2. Objective 
▪ To analyze the influence of culture and carbon-pricing initiatives on economic 
growth and CO2 emissions in 49 jurisdictions, using Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions framework. 
1.4. Contribution of research 
Carbon pricing has been claimed as a cost-effective financial instrument to reduce 
greenhouse-gas emissions (Aldy & Stavins, 2011; Bowen, 2011; Hahn & Stavins, 2011; 
Mehling, Metcalf, & Stavins, 2018; Narassimhan et al., 2017; Newell et al., 2013; 
Schmalensee & Stavins, 2017; Tietenberg, 2013), which have become increasingly 
relevant following the Paris Agreement in 2015. Many countries have pledged 
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emissions reductions targets through the use of carbon-pricing initiatives, which covers 
20% of the global GHG emissions in 2018 (World Bank & Ecofys, 2018). In spite of this 
trend and the fact that several jurisdictions at the national and sub-national level have 
implemented carbon-pricing initiatives, there is little knowledge about the relationship 
between culture and the implementation of carbon-pricing instruments. This thesis 
contributes by addressing this gap, through the analysis of the influence that cultural 
values have on carbon pricing and its effects, to determine if culture intensifies or 
weakens carbon pricing’s impacts on economic growth and CO2 emissions. Thus, 
understanding the relationships between cultural values and carbon pricing could 
provide more information and highlight the importance of developing tailor-made 
strategies according to the culture of the jurisdictions, that enhance climate policy and 











2. Literature review 
This chapter has four sections. The first section describes the interactions between 
economic growth, energy, and CO2 emissions and analyzes the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve hypothesis. The second section delineates the characteristics of climate change 
policies, the implementation of carbon-pricing instruments and their characteristics that 
include the Pigouvian taxes approach and the climate science that supports such 
policies. The third section explores in detail the impacts of carbon-pricing policies on 
economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions. Finally, the fourth section illustrates 
culture and describes in detail the Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory. 
2.1. Economic growth, energy and CO2 emissions 
For a long time, economies have depended significantly on fossil fuels and electricity, 
although, the relationship between energy consumption and economic development has 
been dynamic and complex. Moreover, energy use has been shown to change with 
economic development stages, and although it presents some predictable regularity, a 
closer look reveals many national and subnational specificities that prevent any 
normative conclusions about desirable rates of energy consumption (Smil, 2000).  
A remarkable correlation is discovered by comparing the global consumption of 
commercial energy with the best available reconstruction of the world’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) during the twentieth century. Growth rates of both variables coincide 
almost perfectly, indicating an approximately 16-fold increase in 100 years (Smil, 2000). 
Therefore, energy consumption is considered one of the most important vehicles for 
economic development. Economic growth needs too much energy for gearing its 
momentum in an efficient manner. However, this momentum produces a greater level of 
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CO2 emissions, so policies should be formulated to regulate energy intensity and 
promote economic growth. In addition, emissions’ increase and pollution are highly 
sensitive topics in developed nations that continue to rely heavily on fossil fuels to gear 
the pace of economic growth (Zaman & Moemen, 2017) 
An estimation indicates that OECD countries’ emissions will contribute around 13.8 
billion metric tons of CO2 by 2040 (Zaman & Moemen, 2017). Stern (2008) estimates 
that the economic impact of climate change could reduce annual global GDP by 5-20%, 
while greenhouse gases (GHG) mitigation would cost about 1% of the annual global 
GDP. Thus, the relationship between the CO2 emissions and economic growth is an 
important connection between the economic and environmental policy (Marjanović, 
Milovančević, & Mladenović, 2016).  
Renewable natural resources, and energy in particular, function as inputs into the 
production of goods and services. If the composition of output and the methods of that 
production were constant, then damage to the environment would be inseparably 
related to the scale of global economic activity. But substantial evidence indicates that 
development gives rise to a structural transformation in what an economy produces 
(Grafton & Knowles, 2004; Grossman & Krueger, 1995). Meaning that, the tendencies 
leading to change in the composition and techniques of production may be sufficiently 
strong to offset the negative effects of increased economic activity on the environment 
(Grossman & Krueger, 1995). In addition, Grossman and Krueger (1995) in their 
seminal study found little evidence that environmental quality deteriorates steadily with 
economic growth. Rather, they found for most indicators studied that economic growth 
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brings an initial phase of deterioration of the environment followed by a successive 
phase of improvement.  
On the other hand, many  studies have found that energy intensity and economic scale 
change are the primary driving factors of CO2 emissions (Zhu et al., 2014). The 
relationship between the economic growth and the environmental standards of a society 
is addressed by the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). 
2.1.1. Environmental Kuznets Curve  
The environmental Kuznets curve is a hypothesis that relates various indicators of 
environmental degradation with income per capita (Jaunky, 2011). According to this 
hypothesis, during the early stages of economic growth, environmental degradation and 
pollution increase, but when certain level of income per capita is reached, the trend 
reverses, meaning that high-income levels of economic growth lead to environmental 
improvement. This implies that the environmental impact indicator is an inverted U-
shaped function of income per capita (Stern, 2003). However, the EKC has never been 
shown to apply to all pollutants or environmental impacts (Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang, & 
Wheeler, 2002), and recent evidence challenges the notion of the EKC in general. For 
instance, the impact on individuals' well-being of environmental deterioration caused by 
the processes of economic growth in industrialized countries is evident (Antoci, 2009), 
although in developed countries, individuals have at their disposal many options of 
goods and services to protect themselves from environmental degradation. Additionally, 
Perman and Stern (2003) found that when statistics are considered and appropriate 
techniques are used, the EKC does not exist.  
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Grossman and Krueger (1995) consider that if there were no structural or technological 
changes in the economy; pure growth in the scale of the economy would result in a 
proportional growth in pollution and other negative impacts on the environment, called 
the scale effect (Stern, 2003). The conventional perspective that economic development 
and environmental performance are conflicting objectives reflects the scale effect alone 
(Stern, 2003). Therefore, incorporating other factors in the analysis is important to 
understand which structural changes have to be implemented to ensue the EKC.  
The following proximate factors have to be considered for the EKC to happen:  
• scale of production which consists of output mix, state of the technology, and 
input rations;  
• output mix changes because different industries have different intensities of 
pollution over the course of economic development;  
• changes in input mix, which imply the substitution of less/more environmentally 
damaging inputs;  
• and improvements in state of technology, that involve production efficiency (use 
of less polluting units of input per unit of output) and emissions specific changes 
in process (less pollutants emitted per unit of input) (Stern, 2003).  
On the other hand, Grossman and Krueger (1995) found that the environmental 
improvement in developed countries reflects an increased demand for environmental 
protection at higher levels of income, indicating that as jurisdictions experience greater 
prosperity, their citizens require that more attention be paid to the noneconomic aspects 
of their living conditions. The richer countries, which tend to have relatively cleaner air 
and relatively better environmental conditions, also have higher environmental 
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standards and stricter legal environmental frameworks than in countries with lower 
incomes, many of which still face environmental problems (Grafton & Knowles, 2004).  
Selden and Song (1993) examined the EKC hypothesis in a panel of cross-sectional 
countries and found that air pollutants including suspended particulate matter, sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide rise their concentration along with 
the increase per capita income, while at the later stages of economic development, 
these pollutants considerably decline over time, thus the EKC hypothesis was confirmed 
for the four air pollutants. In addition, it is possible that environmental improvement 
might arise because, as countries develop, they stop to produce some pollution-
intensive goods, and begin to buy these products from other countries with less 
restricting environmental protection laws. Perhaps this is the main explanation for the 
(eventual) inverse relationship between a country's income and pollution (Grossman & 
Krueger, 1995). Consequently, with respect to the inverted U-shaped relation to 
consumption, the Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory indicates that, under free trade, less 
developed countries would specialize in producing goods that are intensive in labor and 
natural resources. The developed countries would specialize in human capital and 
manufactured capital-intensive activities (Stern, 2003). The reduction in environmental 
degradation in the developed countries and increases in environmental degradation in 
middle to low income countries may partly reflect this specialization (Fredriksson & 
World Bank, 1999). Environmental regulation and stricter policies in industrialized 
countries might further encourage polluting activities to gravitate towards the developing 
countries (Suri & Chapman, 1998).  Accordingly, increasing production and 
consumption in developing countries present challenges not only for emissions 
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reduction targets but also in terms of fairness of effective policy instruments (Apergis, 
2016).  
Economic growth related to reduced pollution depends on several factors such as 
greater willingness to pay for environmental protection at higher levels of income. 
Nevertheless, the political factors driving a local EKC (such as voters demanding 
cleaner air and better environmental conditions) may not extend from local pollutants to 
global ones such as CO2, since they show potential for externalization due to global 
mixing of GHGs and are seen as a necessary cost of economic growth (Fernández-
Amador et al., 2017).  
In summary, it appears that the EKC hypothesis only holds under specific 
circumstances and it may influence policy designs if taken into consideration. Aside 
from the EKC's practical application, it's clear that more wealthy countries have enough 
resources to address environmental issues more effectively than poorer countries, 
meaning that the levels of pollutants have declined in those countries over time with the 
implementation of increasingly stricter environmental laws and technical innovations. 
Nevertheless, studies supported by evidence showing that pollution is addressed and 
reduced in developing economies as well (Dasgupta et al., 2002).  
2.2. Climate change policy and carbon pricing 
Anthropogenic climate change is now beyond dispute, and the international climate 
negotiations that address targets for climate mitigation have intensified (Rockström et 
al., 2009). At the present time, more than 30 billion metric tons of CO2 per year are 
emitted globally from fossil fuel combustion (Newell et al., 2013), considering that all 
productive activities that utilize fossil fuels as an energy source, produce greenhouse 
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gas emissions, thus impact global climate. Higher levels of CO2 that accumulate in the 
atmosphere will eventually result in higher global temperatures, greater climate 
variability, and increases in sea levels. These unwanted events are considered external 
costs and are referred to as the social cost of carbon (SCC), which is the basis for 
taxing or otherwise limiting carbon emissions, and is the focus of policy-oriented 
research on climate change (Pyndick, 2013). Climate change policies address these 
externalities impact in one of three ways: a) require businesses and individuals to 
change behaviour towards technology adoption and emissions; b) subsidize businesses 
and individuals to invest in low-carbon services and goods; or c) put a price to 
externalities caused by greenhouse-gas emissions (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). 
Three decades ago, many environmental activists argued that government allocation of 
rights to emit pollution incorrectly legitimized environmental degradation, while others 
questioned the viability of such an approach (Mazmanian & Kraft, 2008), being at that 
time command-and-control the common approach employed. Today is increasingly 
acknowledged that because emission reductions vary greatly, aggregate abatement 
costs under command-and-control approaches can be than they need to be. Instead, by 
putting a price on emissions, carbon pricing tends to equate marginal abatement costs 
rather than emissions levels, and rates across sources. This means that in theory, 
market-based approaches can achieve aggregate pollution reduction targets at 
minimum cost (Schmalensee & Stavins, 2017). Additionally, in recent years, the number 
of carbon-pricing initiatives grows on a near yearly-basis (World Bank et al., 2017), and 
the importance of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of carbon-pricing 
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policies as they emerge is enormous, in environmental, social, and economic terms 
(Schmalensee & Stavins, 2017).  
By pricing CO2 emissions (or the carbon content of the fossil fuels—coal, petroleum, 
and natural gas), governments encourage firms and individuals to find and exploit the 
lowest-cost goods and services to reduce emissions and invest in the implementation 
and development of innovative technologies, methods, and projects that could further 
mitigate emissions. A number of policy instruments can facilitate carbon pricing, 
including carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission reduction credits, clean energy 
standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reduction (Aldy & Stavins, 2011).  
A key question for market-based policies concerns the degree to which they encourage 
long-term investment in new technologies rather than solely short-term fuel-switching 
and energy conservation. Early research into Europe’s ETS indicates that such long-
term investments may be limited (Leiter, Parolini, & Winner, 2011). Although, carbon-
pricing instruments may be still too new to promote those long-term investments, 
studies indicate that renewable energy technologies are becoming economically 
competitive (Silva, Soares, & Pinho, 2012).    
2.2.1. Climate change policy 
Climate change, intensified by anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions, presents an 
immediate and serious threat to both the ecological integrity of the World’s ecosystems, 
and the economic and the social stability of its societies. Nevertheless, international 




Dealing with global warming requires a constant and global effort, because CO2 
emissions remain in the atmosphere for tens or hundreds of years. Moreover, carbon 
dioxide concentrations changes in any one year’s emissions have an insignificant effect 
on current overall concentrations. Even substantial reductions in emissions made today 
will not be evident in atmospheric concentrations for decades (IPCC, 2014). Those 
factors directly affect climate policy design (Shogren & Toman, 2000) and shape much 
of the policy analysis, because it has strong implications for the permissible flow of 
emissions, and thus for emission reduction targets. The reduction targets, in turn, 
influence the pricing and technology policies. Therefore, understanding the risks 
associated to choosing different strategies is basic to an understanding of policy 
(Perman & Stern, 2003); especially, considering that research suggests that resistance 
to innovative environmental policy— whether by citizens, firms, NGOs, or politicians— 
may be driven by lack of knowledge about how it exactly functions and which impacts it 
generates (Baranzini et al., 2017). In that sense, it’s relevant to mention that many 
policies for risk reduction work in terms of targets, usually expressed in terms of 
emission flows, stabilization levels, or average temperature increases (Stern, 2008). 
Consequently, one can think of a GHG abatement policy as a form of insurance: society 
would be paying for a guarantee that a low-probability catastrophe will not occur (or is 
less likely) (Pyndick, 2013).  
The negative effects of climate change most likely will take decades or longer to 
become evident. Numerical estimates of physical impacts are few, and confidence 
intervals are even harder to obtain (Shogren & Toman, 2000). Undetermined physical 
risks are compounded by uncertain socioeconomic consequences. Cost estimates of 
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potential impacts on market goods and services can be made with some confidence. 
But cost estimates for nonmarket goods such as human and ecosystem health give rise 
to serious debate (Shogren & Toman, 2000). In this regard, the social carbon cost 
presents a key point of discussion because of the uncertainty involved around the 
impacts of climate change and the incorporation of future costs due to the long-term 
permanence of CO2 in the atmosphere (Pyndick, 2013). The physical analysis of climate 
change has been the main approach to climate debate, as opposed to the social or 
cultural aspects of it.  
A pragmatic approach to the economic implications of putting a price on carbon is 
usually captured in terms of mitigation costs that result from comparing the policy 
scenario with a baseline that does not include climate change policy (Kriegler et al., 
2015), which presents a problem in designing policy instruments that are efficient 
because they equate marginal social benefits with marginal social costs, assuming that 
the policymakers have adequate information on damages. And in the absence of such 
relevant information or the lack of political will to use it, another important problem 
remains for environmental economics—to design policies that achieve environmental 
targets at the lowest cost, known as the cost-effectiveness challenge (Hahn & Stavins, 
2011). Carbon-pricing policies such as carbon taxes and cap and trade meet the 
principle of cost-effectiveness.  
2.2.2. Carbon prices 
Carbon prices are directly related to climate mitigation efforts because they measure the 
marginal cost of those emissions from sources covered by a jurisdiction’s climate 
change policy (Baranzini et al., 2017). For these reasons, comparisons of the effective 
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carbon prices, or the carbon abatement incentives, that different economic sectors face 
within and across jurisdictions are of great economic, environmental, and political 
interest. Effective carbon prices arise either via explicit carbon prices provided by 
carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, or implicitly, via the abatement incentives 
embedded in other policies that influence GHG emissions (OECD, 2013).  
A comparison of carbon prices across jurisdictions shows the extent to which a 
jurisdiction is creating incentives for more or less expensive mitigation efforts in the 
sectors it regulates (World Bank et al., 2017). However, because jurisdictions implement 
domestic carbon-pricing instruments in their local currencies, the values of these 
different currencies may vary. Although market exchange rates are utilized in the 
context of competitiveness and traded goods, purchasing power parity exchange rates 
allow to compare carbon prices with respect to domestic goods and wages. Thus, a 
comprehensive evaluation would likely compare carbon prices using these rates 
(Narassimhan et al., 2017).  
In addition to comparing different currencies, explicit carbon prices may not precisely 
reflect mitigation efforts. An explicit carbon price may be a limited measure of a 
jurisdiction’s effort to reduce emissions. For instance, it may only cover a portion of a 
jurisdiction’s emissions (e.g., only transportation), and it may fail to consider the impact 
of other, non-price policies that reduce GHG emissions (Aldy & Pizer, 2016). For 
example, regulations supporting energy efficiency regulations or renewable energies 
can achieve significant emissions reductions that are not reflected in the explicit carbon 
prices or energy prices influenced by carbon-pricing. There’s also a risk that a policy 
may affect the effectiveness of the carbon price by subsidizing firms covered by the 
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carbon tax or the emissions cap. Ultimately, the impact represented by carbon prices 
depends on both the price and the emissions reduced (Baranzini, Goldemberg, & 
Speck, 2000). 
An alternative option to using explicit carbon prices are the implicit carbon prices, which 
estimate the average cost of abatement associated with a specific climate policy or a 
group of policies (OECD, 2016). Such implicit prices have the advantage of being 
applied more broadly, but the substantial disadvantage of not being directly observed, 
because they are usually derived from model simulations. To calculate implicit carbon 
prices, costs are divided by estimated abatement. Therefore, implicit carbon prices will 
be high for expensive policies and those that produce little net abatement. Additionally, 
in contrast to high explicit carbon prices, high implicit prices are not market signals, and 
they don’t suggest that all less expensive mitigation options are being incentivized or 
taken, which makes them not as relevant for investment or trade decisions (Aldy & 
Pizer, 2016). 
An equally significant aspect of carbon prices is that empirical evidence shows that 
carbon price changes do change behavior (Bowen, 2011) because the cost of 
emissions control and the price paid for the remaining emissions will be passed forward 
into the prices of final goods and services. Therefore, consumers will pay prices 
reflecting the emissions associated with the production of the goods or the services they 
buy (Goulder & Parry, 2008). As a result, for policymakers, setting a price on carbon 
that reflects the cost of carbon pollution can inform the objective and the ambition of 
climate change policies (Aldy, 2015). For example, the US government used an 
estimate of the social carbon cost (SCC) to assess standards for fuel economy, 
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equipment efficiency and carbon emissions; where the social cost of carbon is defined 
as the present value of monetized damages associated with an incremental ton of CO2 
emissions (Aldy, 2015), in 2013 this cost was US$200 per ton of CO2 (Pyndick, 2013). 
In other words, the SCC indicates the point where profit-maximizing firms will cut back 
on their emissions and the loss of profits from reducing emissions by a further unit (the 
marginal abatement cost) just starts to get bigger than the price it has to pay for 
continuing to emit that unit (Bowen, 2011). In some cases, laws require regulations to 
reflect a weighting of benefits and costs, the application of the SCC could determine the 
ambition of energy and climate policies; in other cases, pricing carbon is basically the 
instrument that underpins climate policies (Aldy, 2015). Moreover, researchers have 
demonstrated that carbon-price increases induce technological improvements, and 
small decreases in energy and oil demand (Bowen, 2011). 
2.2.3. Emission trading systems and carbon taxes 
Carbon-pricing policies to address climate change are relatively new. During the last 
four decades, conventional environmental policy approaches, namely, command-and-
control approaches have dominated climate policy in many countries (Schmalensee & 
Stavins, 2017). Such command-and-control regulatory instruments have two 
approaches: technology-based standards and performance-based standards. 
Technology-based standards demand the use of specific equipment or processes. 
Performance-based standards specify allowable levels of pollutant emissions or 
allowable emission rates, but leave the specific procedures of achieving those levels up 
to regulated entities (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). These command-and-control instruments 
are not cost-effective, because of the variation of abatement costs across businesses 
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(Bowen, 2011). And the limitation of these standards beyond cost-effectiveness is that 
they don’t incentivize firms to adopt superior and more efficient technologies; because 
once the policy’s requirement has been met there is no motivation to adopt cleaner 
technologies (Hahn & Stavins, 2011). These crucial limitations of command-and-control 
regulations can be avoided through the use of market-based policy instruments 
because they tend to equate marginal abatement costs. Additionally, abatement costs 
would be 40-95 percent lower under carbon-pricing policies than under technology 
mandates (Tietenberg, 2013). This means that in theory, market-based approaches can 
achieve aggregate pollution control targets at minimum cost (Schmalensee & Stavins, 
2017)  through the implementation of carbon-pricing instruments (Newell et al., 2013).  
Carbon pricing is a broad term that includes two policy approaches: emissions trading 
schemes and carbon taxes. Emissions trading systems place a cap on the total 
emissions level and leaves to the market the determination of the price, whereas carbon 
taxes set the price and allows the market to determine the total level of emissions 
reduced (Tietenberg, 2013). 
Another relevant feature of the carbon-pricing initiatives is their ability to link jurisdictions 
at the regional, national, and subnational level, especially in the case of emission 
trading schemes. The last ten years have seen the organic growth of linkages between 
many of the world’s cap-and-trade systems, implying that this proliferation of linkages 
indicate that for many nations the expected benefits outweigh expected costs (Ranson 
& Stavins, 2014). These benefits could potentially reduce the cost of achieving the 
emissions reductions specified in the initial NDCs under the Paris Agreement 32% by 
2030 and 54% by 2050 (Mehling et al., 2018).  
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The decision to develop a link between two carbon-pricing systems depends on a 
variety of economic, political, and strategic factors; among them the less studied cultural 
ones. This growing network of decentralized, direct linkages among these systems may 
turn out to be a key part of a future hybrid climate policy architecture (Ranson & Stavins, 
2014).  
2.2.3.1. Emission trading systems 
An ETS also known as a cap-and-trade system, may establish a limit either on total 
emissions or on emissions intensity, as measured by emissions per unit of gross 
domestic product. It may include emissions from all greenhouse gases or just one, such 
as carbon dioxide (Narassimhan et al., 2017).  
An ETS limits the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a determined 
number of allowances and requiring those sources to surrender allowances to cover 
their emissions (Stavins, 2008). Governments then provide allowances, either freely or 
through an auction, equal to the level of the cap (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). Facing the 
choice of surrendering a tradable emission allowance or reducing emissions 
themselves, firms put a price on an allowance that reflects the cost of the reduced 
emissions that can be avoided by surrendering an allowance (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). 
Moreover, firms with lower abatement costs will sell their allowances in secondary 
markets to firms with higher abatement costs, and overall, emissions reductions are 
achieved at least cost (Narassimhan et al., 2017). As a result, irrespective of the initial 
allowance distribution, trading leads allowances to be put to their highest valued use: 
covering those emissions that are the most expensive to reduce and providing the 
incentive to undertake the cheapest reductions (Hahn & Stavins, 2011).  
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Cap-and-trade is considered effective, because it sets an aggregate quantity, and 
through trading, yields a price on emissions, and is effectively the dual of a carbon tax 
that prices emissions and yields a quantity of emissions as firms respond to the tax’s 
mitigation incentives (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). Furthermore, several key design 
considerations of an ETS include how many allowances to issue (i.e., the size or level of 
the emission cap); the scope of the cap’s coverage: identify the types of greenhouse 
gas emissions and sectors covered by the cap; whether to regulate upstream (based on 
carbon content of fuels) or downstream (based on monitored emissions); carbon 
revenue management; monitoring, measurement, and verification of emissions and 
allowances; and impacts on international competitiveness (Narassimhan et al., 2017). 
Other policy design considerations include the flexibility to save allowances for future 
use (banking) or to bring a future period allowance forward for current use (borrowing) 
can promote cost-effective abatement, which makes sense in the case of climate 
change policies, because it is a function of cumulative emissions that remain in the 
atmosphere for long periods of time. In addition, levelling allowance prices over time 
through banking and borrowing reduces the certainty over emissions in any given year, 
but maintains certainty of aggregate emissions over a longer time period (Aldy & 
Stavins, 2011). These considerations are crucial in defining the ambition and 
effectiveness of climate change policies.  
2.2.3.2. Carbon taxes 
The easiest approach to carbon pricing would be through government imposition of a 
carbon tax (Metcalf, 2007), that internalizes the unaccounted public costs of increased 
pollution, ambient and global warming pollution, health and environmental effects, and 
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other impacts of climate change resulting from greenhouse gas emissions 
(Narassimhan et al., 2017). The government could set a tax in terms of dollars per ton 
of carbon dioxide emissions or GHG emissions by sources and sectors covered by the 
tax; a tax on the carbon content of the fossil fuels (Aldy & Stavins, 2011); or on the 
amount of fuel produced/supplied. The latter two are a form of excise tax as different 
fuels emit different amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) in relation to the energy they 
produce, leading to a higher effective price for carbon-intensive fuels such as coal and 
lower price for less carbon-intensive fuels like natural gas (Metcalf, 2007). Additionally, 
important design considerations for a carbon tax system includes choosing the 
appropriate price to achieve cost-effectiveness, emissions coverage, the point of 
taxation (upstream or downstream), stringency (i.e., planned escalation of price over 
time), the flexibility of the price to change in light of new information on marginal cost of 
abatement, allocation of revenue generated from the tax towards general public 
spending or emissions-reducing activities, and harmonization across boundaries 
beyond the jurisdiction of the tax (Narassimhan et al., 2017).  
In order to be efficient, the carbon price would be set equal to the marginal benefits of 
emission reduction, represented by estimates of the social cost of carbon. Furthermore, 
carbon tax could increase to reflect that the more GHG emissions accumulated in the 
atmosphere, the larger the incremental damage of one more ton of CO2 (Aldy, Ley, & 
Parry, 2008). By the same token, focusing on the carbon content of fuels would enable 
the policy to capture a high percentage of CO2 emissions as opposed to the millions of 
exhaust pipes that emit CO2 after fossil fuel consumption (Aldy & Stavins, 2011).  
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As fuel suppliers face the emission tax, they will pass the cost of the fuels to the 
consumers, passing effectively the tax down through the energy system, and creating 
incentives for fuel-switching and investments in more energy-efficient technologies that 
reduce GHG emissions (Aldy & Pizer, 2016).  
The impacts of a carbon tax on emissions and the economy will depend on the amount 
and management of the carbon revenue (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). It could be used to 
reduce the effects of existing distortionary taxes on labor and capital, thereby 
invigorating economic activity and offsetting some of a policy’s social costs. Other 
relevant uses of revenue for social purposes include reduction of debt, and funding 
public programs, such as research and development of climate-friendly technology 
(Goulder & Parry, 2008). 
2.3. Impacts of carbon pricing on economic growth and carbon 
dioxide emissions 
Policymakers usually conduct two common assessments on carbon pricing to design 
climate policies, based on which conclusions of cost-effective or cost-efficient carbon-
pricing policies are made: the impacts on economic growth and emissions reduction (Li, 
Wang, Zhang, & Kou, 2014).  
The specific impacts of carbon pricing on economic growth include distributional 
impacts, effects on competitiveness, and economic benefits through carbon revenue 
management. And the impacts of carbon pricing on the level of CO2 emissions 
encompass the carbon emissions leakage and the actual emissions reductions. 
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2.3.1. Impacts on economic growth  
The projected impact of carbon-pricing policies on economic growth varies slightly 
across jurisdictions and studies, reflecting differences across studies with respect to the 
ambition of mitigation policies considered and to the level of CO2 emissions in a 
business-as-usual scenario. Overall, several authors agree that the impact tends to be 
relatively small (Arlinghaus, 2015; Chateau & Saint-Martin, 2013; Lu, Tong, & Liu, 2010; 
Zhixin & Ya, 2011). In some cases, social welfare can be maximized under an efficiently 
implemented carbon-pricing instrument, and carbon revenues may theoretically be 
invested in a manner that maximizes overall welfare (Goulder & Parry, 2008). On the 
other hand, global warming can have considerable negative impacts on economic 
growth, and not having mitigation measures such as carbon pricing, could reduce 
annual global GDP by 5-20% (Stern, 2008). 
Nonetheless, the introduction of a carbon price causes consumers and producers alike 
to experience both a private welfare loss. By design, pricing carbon will increase prices 
for carbon-intensive energy products and other intermediate and end-use products that 
involve carbon emissions during production or distribution (Jenkins, 2014). Accordingly, 
market forces will spontaneously work in a cost-effective way to reduce the quantity of 
emissions. Moreover, carbon pricing possesses two incentive effects. A ‘direct effect’, 
through price increases, promoting conservation measures, energy efficient 
investments, fuel and product switching, and economic changes in the production and 
consumption structures. An ‘indirect effect’, through the recycling of the collected fiscal 
revenues, reinforcing the previous effects, by changing investment and consumption 
patterns (Baranzini et al., 2000).  
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2.3.1.1. Competitiveness  
Competitiveness is the ability of a country or a firm to create sustainable economic 
operations at micro and macro levels (Kleesma, Viiding, & Latosov, 2011). Therefore, 
the possibility that putting a price on carbon dioxide emissions in the form of a tax or an 
emissions trading scheme has adverse effects on a sector or a country's 
competitiveness is often a major concern for policymakers planning to introduce such 
instruments (Arlinghaus, 2015). When assessing the impacts on competitiveness, it's 
important to consider that the price signal of an ETS is not entirely equivalent to a 
carbon tax. Taxes are compulsory and one-way revenue-raising fiscal policy 
instruments. In contrast, the purchase of an emissions certificate in an ETS context is 
associated with the right to pollute (Arlinghaus, 2015).  
The competitiveness effects of carbon pricing can result in negative economic and 
environmental outcomes, especially, for firms in energy intensive and trade exposed 
(EITE) sectors, such as iron and steel industries, forestry, and metal mining sectors. 
They may relocate facilities to countries without meaningful climate change policies, 
thereby increasing emissions in these new locations and offsetting some of the 
environmental benefits of the policy (Aldy & Pizer, 2016). These negative outcomes are 
often addressed in climate policies by protecting firms in EITE sectors through the 
implementation of measures, such as the establishment of border adjustments in the 
form of tariffs on goods imported from countries that do not price carbon and border 
rebates on exports (Gray & Metcalf, 2017). An alternative option is to provide additional 
support to domestic firms in EITE sectors in the form of exemptions or free-allowance 
allocations (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). Moreover, other factors are also relevant in 
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evaluating the impacts on competitiveness inflicted by carbon-pricing instruments, such 
as feature exemptions, emission permits, and whether revenue recycling is considered 
or not.  
Employment is another aspect at the center of the debate around climate policies since 
many policymakers deem carbon pricing a question of “jobs versus environment”, 
although it is not clear how changes in employment relate to competitiveness (Flues & 
Lutz, 2015). An expansion of employment could be a sign of an expansion of 
production, but a large workforce may also indicate less productivity. Additionally, 
carbon pricing might also induce a restructuring of employment between more and less 
polluting sectors, where the net effect on employment is not clear (OECD, 2011). For 
instance, Chateau and Saint-Martin (2013) found that net employment effects are small 
whereas there is a considerable shift of workers away from declining sectors, such as 
coal mining and other sectors that are producers or heavy users of fossil fuels, and 
toward industries producing clean energy and also goods and services whose products 
result in the least carbon emissions when produced and consumed.  
2.3.1.2. Distributional effects 
The evidence indicates that in the short-run the impact of carbon pricing on real 
incomes via consumer prices is regressive, meaning that lower-income groups take a 
proportionately larger hit. Lower-income groups in most nations tend to spend a larger 
proportion of their incomes on electricity, home heating fuels, gasoline, and other 
energy-intensive goods. Although this is not necessarily the case in poorer countries 
where the very poor have no access to fossil fuel energy (Bowen, 2011). Many low-
income households may not be able to afford any increase in expenditures, and a 
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carbon-pricing instruments should ensure that these households are not driven deeper 
into poverty. For households, higher energy prices imply reduced purchasing power, as 
well as a shift in purchasing behavior away from carbon-intensive goods and services 
(Kaufman & Krause, 2016). For instance, in the U.S. the effects of carbon prices on total 
household expenditures in energy, range from 2.1 percent for the poorest household 
grouping to 1.3 percent for the wealthiest grouping (Mathur & Morris, 2014).  
In this sense, changes in energy prices depend on the carbon intensity of a household’s 
energy use, meaning that the more carbon-intensive it is, the more a carbon price will 
change the energy prices that household pays. At the same time, the carbon intensity of 
household energy use depends on how electricity is produced in the region and how a 
given household uses energy (Mathur & Morris, 2014). Households that use energy 
predominantly for driving will have different carbon intensities compared to households 
that use energy predominately for heating or electricity, implying different distributional 
impacts (Kaufman & Krause, 2016). Additionally, how the proceeds from carbon pricing 
are distributed have decisive impacts on the ultimate distributional outcome (Rausch, 
Metcalf, & Reilly, 2011). 
2.3.1.3. Carbon revenue management 
In 2017, the total value of carbon-pricing instruments was US$52 billion (World Bank & 
Ecofys, 2018). More than US$28.3 billion in government carbon revenues are collected 
each year in 40 countries and another 16 subnational jurisdictions around the world 
(World Bank et al., 2017). Of those revenues, 27% (US$7.8 billion) are used to finance 
“green” spending in energy efficiency or renewable energy; 26% (US$7.4 billion) go 
towards state general funds; and 36% (US$10.1 billion) are returned to corporate or 
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individual tax payers through paired tax cuts or direct rebates. As shown in Table 1, 
emission trading systems (US$6.57 billion in total public revenue) earmark a larger 
share of revenues for “green” spending (70%), while carbon tax schemes (US$21.7 
billion) usually refund revenues or otherwise direct them toward government general 
funds (72% of revenues) (Carl & Fedor, 2016). The net carbon revenues are 
substantial, and the GDP and welfare impacts of carbon pricing depend significantly on 
how these revenues are recycled. There are also beneficial impacts to the economy 
from avoided climate change that are not frequently taken into account in many studies 
(Goulder & Hafstead, 2013). Revenues generated from auctioning allowances and 
carbon taxes could be used in climate change mitigation, reducing distortionary taxes, 
reducing budget deficits, addressing competitiveness concerns, augmenting 
government expenditure on public goods, or to increase the flow of climate finance from 
developed to developing countries (Narassimhan et al., 2017). Distributional effects can 
be alleviated in different ways. On one hand, financial compensations can be given to 
groups who would otherwise carry an uneven portion of the burden (Bowen, 2011). On 
the other hand, carbon taxes or ETSs can be complemented by other policy instruments 
to provide compensatory payments. Carbon revenues, for example, can be used to 
reduce payroll taxes that discourage labor force participation. If authorities are 
motivated into tackling these market and public policy failures by the threat of climate 
change, the costs of emissions reductions can be offset to some extent, while also 
accelerating the transition to a  sustainable, low-carbon economy (Bowen, 2015). 
Finally, governments can use revenue to invest in infrastructure, complementary 
environmental policies, clean energy projects, R&D or climate change adaptation 
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(Narassimhan et al., 2017). Yet revenues could also be used to reduce outstanding 
public debt or spent on social objectives that have nothing to do with climate change. 
Reforming the tax-benefit system and public debt management are issues that arise 
irrespective of the need for carbon pricing and raise questions that are quite separate 
from the ones raised by the need to make growth green (Bowen, 2015), which in the 
end also affect economic growth. Additionally, some countries earmark the carbon 
revenue in an attempt to achieve a double dividend in emissions reductions, meaning 
that not only the emission reductions are attained, but also an improvement in the 
economic efficiency from the use of carbon revenues to reduce other taxes such as 
income taxes that distort labor supply and saving decisions (Carl & Fedor, 2016). 
Table 1. Global cap-and-trade and carbon tax system revenues  












European ETS US$ 4640 0.03% 80% 20% 0% 
California ETS US$ 1034 0.05% 45% 4% 55% 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(U.S.) 
US$ 447 0.01% 49% 32% 12% 
Chinese Provincial ETS pilots US$ 250 0.02% 10% 90% 0% 
Quebec Cap and Trade  US$ 100 0.03% 100% 0% 0% 
Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction US$ 92 0.03% 90% 10% 0% 
Switzerland ETS US$ 9 0.00% 0% 100% 0% 
Australia carbon-pricing mechanism US$ 8790 0.60% 15% 1% 53% 
Sweden carbon dioxide tax US$ 3680 0.67% 0% 50% 50% 
Norway carbon dioxide tax US$ 1580 0.31% 30% 40% 30% 
United Kingdom carbon price floor US$ 1530 0.05% 0% 85% 0% 
British Columbia carbon tax US$ 1100 0.49% 0% 0% 102% 
Denmark carbon dioxide tax US$ 1000 0.29% 8% 47% 45% 
Switzerland carbon dioxide levy US$ 875 0.13% 33% 0% 67% 
Mexico special tax  US$ 870 0.06% 0% 100% 0% 
Finland carbon dioxide tax US$ 800 0.29% 0% 50% 50% 
Ireland carbon tax US$ 510 0.03% 13% 88% 0% 
Japan tax for climate change US$ 490 0.01% 100% 0% 0% 
France carbon dioxide tax US$ 452 0.02% 100% 0% 0% 
Iceland carbon tax US$ 30 0.22% 0% 100% 0% 
Note. Adapted from Tracking global carbon revenues: A survey of carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade in 




2.3.1.4. Expected impacts on GDP’s growth rate 
Carbon pricing entails impacts for the entire economy of a jurisdiction. In a competitive 
market, carbon prices can be passed through to energy prices for downstream 
industries and it’s expected to generate cost-efficient CO2 emissions reductions (Li et 
al., 2014). In the short-run, carbon prices will rise proportionally the prices of related 
goods and services, increase the costs of the enterprises, reduce the competitiveness 
of energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, and inflict adverse impacts on 
economic growth (Lin & Li, 2011). Some authors argue that the adverse economic 
impacts of carbon pricing on the economy are minimal to non-existent depending on 
how carbon revenues are employed, which has a relevant effect on the projected GDP 
loss. They emphasize that the potential GDP losses could be reduced considerably by 
using the carbon revenues to reduce existing taxes that discourage economic activity. 
For instance, the projections of the average annual carbon tax revenues raised in the 
United States from 2000 to 2020 to achieve a 20% reduction of CO2 emissions range 
from US$65 billion to US$ 300 billion (Gaskins & Weyant, 1993). Thus, it’s 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1  The higher the carbon price the lower the short-term GDP growth 
rate. 
2.3.2. Impacts on CO2 emissions 
The main objective of carbon-pricing instruments is to reduce carbon emissions, most 
existing carbon policies have no  specific requirements to assess policy effectiveness in 
reducing emissions, although some attempted to evaluate their impacts (Lin & Li, 2011). 
Identifying the overall impacts of carbon-pricing instruments can be challenging 
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because many factors affect the carbon emissions, including economic growth and 
other programs designed to address environmental impacts (Sumner, Bird, & Smith, 
2009). Jurisdictions have used different metrics to determine the emission benefits of 
carbon pricing. One of the most common metrics for assessing carbon pricing 
effectiveness is overall reductions in CO2 emissions that can be tracked using GHG 
emissions inventories at the national or subnational level (Aldy & Pizer, 2016). This 
metric is somewhat flawed because it reflects not only the carbon pricing effects but 
also the effects of other carbon reduction polices and variables such as the level of 
economic growth. While these metrics lack precision, jurisdictions can use it to evaluate 
their overall GHG reduction goals and to determine whether policies, including carbon 
pricing, are effective (Sumner et al., 2009).  
Baranzini et al. (2000) indicate that the final impact on emissions depends, among other 
factors, on the emissions covered, meaning what is exactly taxed or capped, and the 
level of carbon prices (i.e. how much to pay). Indeed, if the carbon price is set at a 
relatively low level (compared to marginal abatement costs), or if energy demand is 
relatively insensitive to price changes, then emissions will not decrease sufficiently to 
attain a given abatement objective (Baranzini et al., 2000). Both factors, the level of 
carbon prices and the coverage of emissions reflect the ambition of the carbon-pricing 
policy (Narassimhan et al., 2017). 
2.3.2.1. Ambition of carbon-pricing instruments 
Ambition in this context captures the extent to which a carbon-pricing instrument 
contributes to global climate mitigation efforts. The product of coverage and stringency, 
defined as the “coverage adjusted carbon price”, indicates the level of ambition of an 
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ETS system and a carbon tax (Pyndick, 2013). The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) located in the West Coast of the U.S., for example, stands out as one of the 
most well-planned and well-executed ETS markets with full auctioning of allowances 
and efficient use of carbon revenues, but could be considered the least ambitious ETS 
program with a coverage adjusted price of $0.53 per ton of GHG emissions even though 
its emissions fell 57% between 2005 and 2016, perhaps induced by other 
complementary policies (Narassimhan et al., 2017). Carbon prices adjusted for sectoral 
coverage and exemptions are significantly lower than they would be without such 
exemptions in most of the carbon-pricing schemes. For instance, Ireland and Norway 
exempt certain EITE sectors and cover most of their respective economies with either a 
carbon tax or the EU ETS, but their effective carbon prices are less than US$10 per ton 
of CO2 emissions (Narassimhan et al., 2017).  
2.3.2.2. Carbon leakage 
Another important issue with respect to the impacts of carbon pricing on emissions is 
carbon leakage, where increases in carbon emissions outside of a particular jurisdiction 
offset the reductions achieved within the jurisdiction. Carbon leakage occur in at least 
two ways. First, new regulations within one jurisdiction can increase production costs, 
causing emitting firms to move to another jurisdiction. Second, new regulations 
implemented by one jurisdiction can shift consumer demands away from goods and 
services produced within that jurisdiction, leading to increased demands and emissions 
elsewhere (Goulder & Parry, 2008). However, the extent of carbon leakage is 
controversial and there is considerable debate over the design of the correct policy mix 
to reduce it (Antimiani, Costantini, Martini, Salvatici, & Tommasino, 2013), being the 
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major concern with respect to carbon leakage that carbon reductions would not 
contribute to global emission reductions and the effectiveness of the climate strategies 
might be undermined (Dröge, 2009). 
A popular option to tackle carbon leakage is border adjustment for imports, which 
usually implies requiring importers to pay a tax according to the emissions associated 
with their product’s production, at the same price as faced by domestic producers 
(Fischer & Fox, 2012).  
Another important consideration to prevent carbon leakage is the potential for policy 
linkages across jurisdictions, which is easier to implement for cap-and-trade schemes. 
Generally, linkages are likely when jurisdictions have similar environmental goals, 
economic conditions, a history of productive engagement on other issues and familiarity 
with each other’s regulatory and political systems (Ranson & Stavins, 2014). 
Additionally, in case that political constraints induce policies to be made by authorities 
whose jurisdictions are less efficient, the situation can be improved through linkages 
across regional programs (Fischer & Fox, 2012).     
2.3.2.3. Expected impacts on the CO2 emissions’ growth rate 
As described before, the primary motivation for implementing carbon-pricing initiatives is 
their ability to attain environmental goals, in particular, the reduction of GHG emissions, 
while simultaneously increasing economic efficiency. Consequently, a reduction in 
carbon dioxide emissions closely associated with a decrease in fossil fuel consumption 
improves air quality, and through carbon revenue recycling may promote technological 
innovation. Additionally, compared to the benefits of climate change mitigation and 
prevention, which are global and long-term, the benefits resulting from the reduction of 
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local environmental problems, such as air quality in big cities, would mainly accrue in 
the short term and at the local level. (Baranzini et al., 2000).  
According to (Siegmeier, Mattauch, & Edenhofer, 2018), carbon pricing is the key to 
decarbonizing the economy. As one of the CO2 mitigation methods, carbon pricing can 
also reduce energy use, regulate emission flows, improve energy efficiency and 
simultaneously promote the development of renewable energy. This emissions-
reduction impact, among other factors, comes mainly from the level of carbon prices. 
For example, the carbon tax rates in Sweden (US$ 45/tonCO2 in 1991) are generally 
higher than those in other countries, which is one of the main reasons why the absolute 
decrement of CO2 emissions per capita in Sweden (13% emissions reduction between 
1990 and 2008) is much larger than it in other countries (Lin & Li, 2011). Thus, it’s 
expected:   
Hypothesis 2 The higher the carbon prices, the lower the short-term growth rate 
of CO2 emissions. 
2.4. Culture  
UNESCO (2012, p. 5) in their Post-2015 Agenda recognizes the relevance of culture as 
a “driver and enabler of environmental sustainability”, and the lessons learned during 
the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) emphasize that 
“leaving out the cultural context has been blamed for the failure of well-intentioned 
development programs and the gaps in achieving the MDGs”, revealing the “inadequacy 
of universal policies and approaches to development.”  
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Universal environmental policies play a crucial role in climate change mitigation. 
Examples of these policies and instruments are laws, taxes, tradable permits, 
distribution of information, and subsidies. Nevertheless, the cost-effectiveness of a 
policy is a key decision parameter in a world with scarce resources (Gupta et al., 2007), 
and considering specific cultural contexts where those universal policies are applied 
improve their chances of a successful implementation, thus their cost-effectiveness. On 
the other hand, the negative impacts of energy consumption and anthropocentric 
emissions on climatic conditions may be diminished or intensified by cultural factors, 
which are embedded in all societies (Disli et al., 2016).  
Culture defines the behavior of individuals and groups in their relation to authority, self-
conception, and the ways of dealing with conflicts (Disli et al., 2016). Similar to social 
capital, cultural capital (i.e., the knowledge of informal institutions) not only defines 
guidelines or constraints for economic behavior, but also serves as self-enforcement 
mechanism (Disli et al., 2016). The notion that social/human capital, the social bonds, 
norms, and values in a society, are important to environmental sustainability is because 
they, in part, determine the nature of the society's relationship to its natural capital. In 
this regard, researchers have investigated the relationship between connectedness 
among people and the environmental condition in a society (Park, Russell, & Lee, 
2007). This clarifies why cultural factors are increasingly recognized as being important 
in dealing with environmental issues (Disli et al., 2016). Moreover, cultural values tend 
to be quite stable over time and thus do not offer instruments that can be manipulated in 
order to achieve specific policy goals (Hofstede, 1980). This contributes to support the 
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notion that if culture is not considered during the development of policies, initiatives may 
no be implemented successfully.  
Another relevant aspect is that in addition to the development of culturally congruent 
programs, understanding the influence of culture helps policymakers to know whether 
environmental practices used in one jurisdiction can be transferred effectively to another 
(Husted, 2005), which is critical in the elaboration of climate change policies that are 
commonly designed globally.  
2.4.1. Hofstede’s framework 
Culture has been described in different ways. Hofstede’s shorthand definition is: 
"Culture is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of 
one group or category of people from others" (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 
6). Moreover, culture has been used in many fields, anthropology, sociology, 
management, political science, occupational, organizational, among many others to 
explain distinctive traits of people in one group from others (Hofstede, 2011). On the 
other hand, changing the level of aggregation studied changes the nature of the concept 
of ‘culture’. Societal, national and gender cultures, which people adopt from an early 
age, are much deeper rooted in the human mind than occupational cultures acquired at 
school, or than organizational cultures acquired on the job. For example an 
organizational culture can be changed as people take new jobs, as opposed to societal 
culture, which is not easily exchangeable (Hofstede, 2001).   
During the second half of the twentieth century, authors speculated about the nature of 
the basic problems of societies that would present distinct dimensions of culture. And 
the most commonly used dimension to order societies is their degree of economic 
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evolution and modernity. Economic evolution is reflected in people’s collective mental 
programming, but there are other cultural varieties unrelated to economic evolution 
many authors have also studied in an attempt to apply these dimensions to different 
levels of aggregation (Hofstede, 2001). In 1969 Inkeles and Levinson distilled three 
standard analytic issues that were the precursors of Hofstede’s framework: relation to 
authority, conception of self (masculinity), and primary dilemmas or conflicts (Hofstede, 
1997).  
In 1970 Geert Hofstede had access to a database about values and sentiments of 
people in 50 countries around the world. These people worked in the local subsidiaries 
of IBM. The relevant characteristic about this database was that initial analyses of the 
database at the level of individual respondents were confusing, but the data revealed an 
interesting correlation when they were analyzed at the level of countries (Hofstede, 
1980). One of the strengths of this study is that, in terms of culture, Hofstede was able 
to establish a clear difference between the societal level and the individual level. 
Hofstede continued his study and he identified that the mean scores by country 
correlated significantly with the country scores obtained from the IBM database. 
 Apparently, IBM employees’ profiles, with presence in countries all over the world could 
be useful to identify differences in national value systems. The reason being that from 
one country to another they represented almost perfectly matched samples: they were 
similar in all aspects except nationality, which made the effect of national differences in 
their answers stand out  clearly, encouraging him to conduct a country-level analysis 
factor (Hofstede, 2011). Factor analyzing revealed common problems that IBM 
employees were dealing with in all these societies. The following problems were 
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identified: dependence on superiors; a need for rules and predictability; the balance 
between individual goals and dependence on the company; the balance between ego 
values and social values. These results were similar to Inkeles and Levinson’s standard 
analytic issues and were empirically supported by the IBM data, which gave origin to the 
dimensions of national culture; where a dimension is an aspect of a culture that can be 
measured relative to other cultures. (Hofstede, 1997). The six cultural dimensions are 
labelled: Power Distance, related to the problem of human inequality; Uncertainty 
Avoidance, related to the level of stress in a society or individuals in the face of 
ambiguity; Individualism versus Collectivism, related to the integration of individuals into 
primary groups;  Masculinity versus Femininity, related to the division of emotional roles 
between women and men;  Long Term versus Short Term Orientation, related to the 
choice of focus for people's efforts according to its temporality; and Indulgence versus 
Restraint, related to the gratification versus self-control of basic human desires 
(Hofstede, 2001).  
In Hofstede’s approach, each country has been positioned relative to other countries 
through a score on each dimension. The dimensions are statistically distinct and do 
occur in all possible combinations, although some combinations are more frequent than 
others (Hofstede, 2001). Nevertheless, researchers have shown that there is plenty of 
within-country variation on cultural values (Hofstede, 1980). 
Research that uses a wide array of frameworks has shown that cultural dimensions are 
related to  behaviors and attitudes in organizational environments; and perhaps the 
most influential cultural classifications is that of Geert Hofstede (Kirkman, Lowe, & 
Gibson, 2006). Hofstede’s cultural distances have been applied in thousands of 
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empirical studies and researchers have used Hofstede’s framework successfully to 
select countries that are culturally different in order to increase variance, and most 
country differences predicted by Hofstede were supported. Therefore, Hofstede’s values 
are clearly relevant for cross-cultural research. For instance, many studies that used 
Hofstede’s cultural values as moderators at the country level have shown important 
effects on micro and macro level (Kirkman et al., 2006).  
Despite the unquestionable acceptance of the cultural dimensions, some critical voices 
of Hofstede’s work indicate that the limited characterization of his work, its confinement 
within the territory of states, and its methodological weaknesses mean that it is not an 
enhancer of understanding particularities. It is also mentioned that if the aim is 
understanding culture then it’s necessary to know more about the richness and diversity 
of national practices and institutions – rather than merely assuming their ‘uniformity’ 
(McSweeney, 2002).  
Another critique indicates several contention points to Hofstede’s work: cultures do not 
equate to nations, pointing out that many cultures have been identified in one country; 
the transparency with which Hofstede related the cultural dimensions with other studies 
of country or national differences for the purposes of making international comparisons, 
indicating that cultural distances are more correlated with socio-economic national 
indicators than culture itself. For example, power distance shows a close relationship to 
educational and occupational class indices; and that ascribing numerate indices to 
cultural attributes generates methodological issues, because of the dynamic and 
adaptive nature of the balance between such attributes (Baskerville, 2003). 
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Although the criticism of Hofstede's work, several researchers have attempted to 
measure culture and cultural differences, and as Taras, Kirkman, and Steel (2010, p. 
406) state: ‘‘virtually all later models of culture include Hofstede’s dimensions and have 
conformed to his approach’’. The researchers include the following: concepts developed 
by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) and Trompenaars (1993); and the GLOBE model 
(House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Among these studies, the culture 
scores developed by Hofstede have been the most widely applied (Shi & Wang, 2011).  
Despite the relevance of culture in shaping human behavior, only a limited number of 
studies have specifically addressed the role of culture in environmental sustainability. 
For instance, using Hofstede's cultural dimensions, Husted (2005) demonstrated that 
there is a relationship between a jurisdiction's cultural values (power distance, 
individualism, and masculinity) and its social and institutional capacity for environmental 
sustainability. In a cross-country study, Park et al. (2007) examined the influence of the 
cultural dimensions on the environmental performance. They found that both power 
distance and masculinity are negatively related to environmental sustainability, and 
demonstrated that the applicability of the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis is 
limited when cultural values are included in their model. Peng and Lin (2009) found that 
national cultural dimensions, particularly power distance and masculinity are 
significantly related to environmental performance. Onel and Mukherjee (2014) 
described that individualism and uncertainty avoidance have a positive relationship with 
environmental health. Disli et al. (2016) determined that in countries with more power 
distance, masculinity, and indulgence; the EKC shifts upward in early economic 
development stages. Lahuerta-Otero and González-Bravo (2017) found that a country’s 
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cultural factors influence its environmental performance, indicating that power distance, 
masculinity, and long-term orientation explains air quality with an inverse relationship.    
From different perspectives (Disli et al., 2016; Husted, 2005; Lahuerta-Otero & 
González-Bravo, 2017; Onel & Mukherjee, 2014; Park et al., 2007; Peng & Lin, 2009) 
agree that including culture in the development of policies and promoting a culture of 
shared responsibility, results in strengthened institutional capacities that can effectively 
combat environmental degradation. Because of the influence of culture as well as 
different levels of income and development, it’s preferable to develop strategies that 
allow jurisdictions to set their own environmental policy objectives and goals instead of 
adopting common targets for all jurisdictions (Disli et al., 2016). For this reason, it’s 
imperative for policymakers to recognize cultural diversity. In other words, global targets 
and especially their subnational implementation should incorporate local cultural factors 
(Disli et al., 2016), because societies may not be able to make any material changes 
required to achieve environmental sustainability if they fail to reach beneath physical 
challenges and confront problems at a much deeper level in their culture and 
consciousness (Elgin, 1994). Namely, it is not only in the external physical environment, 
but just as much in our cultures, (i.e., in our heads), that change has to take place, if we 
are to have a world that is sustainable for the human race in the future (Packalén, 
2010). 
Culture functions as a guidance for individual behavior and norms for group interactions 
and collaborations. Cultural values entail beliefs, and standards, serving as a strong 
informal institution that shapes human interactions (Hofstede, 2001). Given the 
importance of culture, in this study it’s examined how the cultural values of a country 
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influence its climate policies and instruments through carbon pricing, and the effect 
these carbon prices have on economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions levels.  
2.4.2. Cultural dimensions 
Power distance. This cultural dimension how the less powerful members of a society 
are willing to accept the unequal distribution of power. High power distance societies 
are hierarchical, and they accept their role within them. These societies have a great 
deal of respect for those in authority (Keegan & Green, 2015).  
In low power distance societies, individuals are part of the decision-making processes 
(Hollesen & Arteaga, 2010), so they feel more involved in global issues, such as climate 
change. By contrast, societies with high levels of power distance will display a larger 
gap between the minority groups in power and the majority groups who assume their 
role. This frequently leads societies to become passive with respect to social initiatives 
and debates over issues affecting the environment. As a result, a system characterized 
by a high score in power distance will be less able to debate and participate actively in 
social issues, including environmental and climate change problems (Husted, 2005). 
Based on these arguments it is expected that societies with high power distance have 
high inequality and less economic growth (Papamarcos & Watson, 2006). Thus, it’s 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3A  The lower the level of power distance in a jurisdiction, the higher 
the GDP’s growth rate. 
Hypothesis 4A  The higher the level of power distance in a jurisdiction, the higher 
the CO2 emissions’ growth rate. 
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Individualism. Hofstede (1997) describes individualistic cultures as those in which 
individuals are independent from others and take care of themselves and their 
immediate families. They will focus to reach their own objectives first, rather than 
collective ones (Hollesen & Arteaga, 2010). Conversely, collectivistic societies care 
about the members of the group in exchange of unquestionable loyalty, meaning that 
common values prevail over individual opinions. Some researchers believe that in 
collectivistic cultures, individuals are expected to collaborate toward society’s interests 
and maintain harmony, as they are committed to future well-being. Consequently, 
collectivists will participate actively in environmental actions and policies (Parboteeah, 
Addae, & Cullen, 2012) as they pursue a future quality of life that implies present 
commitment and effort, where opinions and votes are predetermined in-group (Park et 
al., 2007). On the other hand, a different group of authors argue that individualists are 
more prone to protect the environment, considering that individualistic cultures 
potentiate and value personal initiatives, where tasks such as engaging in 
environmental debates prevail over relationships (Cox, Friedman, & Tribunella, 2011). 
Accordingly, individualistic cultures will be in a better position to respond to climate 
change issues, as individual environmental initiatives reinforced by pressure groups 
(Husted, 2005) will be easier to implement. In this sense, individualists, with their 
concerns and resourcefulness, are expected to create more consciousness in which 
individuals accept responsibilities (Onel & Mukherjee, 2014) that translate into 
environmental policies and initiatives to address these climate change concerns. 
Therefore, environmental interest-groups activities appear to be much more widespread 
and diverse in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures (Husted, 2005). 
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Considering the different perspectives presented in the literature, it is reasonable to 
expect that there are more chances that pro environmental initiatives emerge in 
individualistic societies than in collectivistic ones. And based on their resourcefulness 
and independent nature, individualistic societies require strong economies to flourish in 
self-sufficient environments. Thus, it’s expected: 
Hypothesis 3B  The more individualistic a jurisdiction, the higher the GDP’s growth 
rate. 
Hypothesis 4B  The more individualistic a jurisdiction, the lower the CO2 emissions’ 
growth rate. 
Masculinity.  This dimension has two elements, gender egalitarianism and achievement 
orientation (Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2012); it refers, among other things, to a focus on 
“material success”, as opposed to a concern with the “quality of life” (Hofstede, 1997). 
Hofstede’s (2001) discussion directly links masculinity to the preference for material 
wealth and argues that masculinity creates a preference for economic growth over 
environmental conservation. An analysis of this cultural dimension indicates that 
women’s cultural values differ less among societies than men’s cultural values 
(Hofstede, 2011), highlighting that the pursuit of economic growth, typical of masculine 
cultures, will lead to a slower adoption of costlier environmental friendly technologies 
and reduce their responsiveness to climate problems. Masculine cultures, oriented to 
the achievement of goals and targets, tend to have less perception of future risks. They 
therefore tend to ignore environmental risks, as climate change is not sufficiently 
important to them (Park et al., 2007). Conversely, low-masculinity societies pay more 
attention to social dynamics, and females traditionally take more responsibility for social 
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needs. Moreover, females tend to be more conscious about environmental issues and 
ecological balancing (Eisler, Eisler, & Yoshida, 2003). Thus, it’s hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3C  The greater the masculinity of a jurisdiction, the higher the GDP’s 
growth rate. 
Hypothesis 4C  The greater the masculinity of a jurisdiction, the higher the CO2 
emissions’ growth rate. 
Uncertainty avoidance.  This dimension represents the degree to which people feel 
averse to ambiguity. Some authors (Disli et al., 2016; Lahuerta-Otero & González-
Bravo, 2017; Park et al., 2007; Peng & Lin, 2009) utilize uncertainty avoidance as 
synonym of risk avoidance, but Hofstede (2011, p. 10) expresses explicitly that 
“uncertainty avoidance is not the same as risk avoidance.” The use of risk avoidance as 
an interchangeable term with uncertainty avoidance, might lead to misinterpretations 
and inconsistency in the results associated to this cultural dimension. Uncertainty 
avoidance, in essence, indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to deal 
with unstructured situations. Unstructured situations are new, unfamiliar, unexpected, 
and different from usual (Hofstede, 1997). Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize 
the possibility of such situations by strict behavioral codes, laws and rules, disapproval 
of deviant opinions. Countries with high levels of uncertainty avoidance seek to make 
decisions that affect negatively citizen empowerment, which is essential for a country’s 
environmental sustainability (Husted, 2005). Studies have also demonstrated that 
people in high uncertainty avoiding societies are more emotional and motivated by inner 
nervous energy. Conversely, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of 
opinions different from what they are used to; they try to have fewer rules, and on the 
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philosophical level they are empiricists, relativists and allow different currents to flow 
side by side (Hofstede, 2001). With respect to economic growth, high uncertainty 
countries have countless legislations, 
regulations and laws in order to lower uncertainty and control everything (Hancıoğlu, 
Doğan, & Yıldırım, 2014), which can be restrictive for innovation, entering new markets, 
creating new jobs, and increasing competition; whereas low uncertainty avoidance 
countries tend to have a greater willingness to take risks, to dissent, and to live 
with as few rules as possible (Papamarcos & Watson, 2006). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that restrictive regulations with low incentives for innovation in high uncertainty 
avoiding societies are economically developing slower and having lower rates of 
entrepreneurship and technological innovation. Furthermore, environmental challenges 
require societies with a higher degree of tolerance toward new ideas, different opinions, 
and discussion forums that enable the environmental debate and solutions beyond the 
status quo. Thus, it’s expected: 
Hypothesis 3D  The lower the uncertainty avoidance, the higher the GDP’s growth 
rate. 
Hypothesis 4D  The lower the uncertainty avoidance, the lower the CO2 emissions’ 
growth rate. 
Long-term orientation. This dimension reflects the degree to which members of a 
jurisdiction orient their thinking toward the more distant future. Values associated with 
long-term orientation are thrift, perseverance, and having a sense of shame; whereas 
values associated with short-term orientation are respect for tradition, reciprocating 
social obligations, and personal steadiness and stability (Hofstede, 2001). From a cost-
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benefit perspective, societies concerned with the short-term will prioritize present costs 
over future benefits, so they will not engage in environmental long-run initiatives unless 
present benefits are higher than the costs. On the other hand, long-term-oriented 
jurisdictions can estimate the future benefits of present actions. Once they upgrade the 
benefits, they will be willing to face the present costs (Lahuerta-Otero & González-
Bravo, 2017). According to the aforementioned analysis and considering that the global 
economy is still heavily dependent on relatively inexpensive fossil fuels, a transition 
towards renewable sources will likely cause more present-day economic pain for short-
term oriented cultures (Disli et al., 2016). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that long-term-
oriented societies value the safety that economic expansion and favorable 
environmental conditions provide to assure the welfare of the communities. Therefore, 
it’s proposed the following:   
Hypothesis 3E  A higher level of long-term orientation will produce a higher growth 
rate of the GDP.  
Hypothesis 4E  A higher level of long-term orientation will produce a lower growth 
rate of CO2 emissions. 
Indulgence. This dimension refers to jurisdictions that allow free gratification of basic 
and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint refers to a 
society that controls gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social 
norms (Hofstede, 2011). Indulgent jurisdictions are tolerant towards individuals’ desires 
to enjoy themselves and spend money. Restrained societies regulate and curb such 
gratification. Even though this dimension has not been widely tested, indulgent societies 
characterize themselves by a more wasteful and extravagant lifestyle, which, may 
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cause environmental pollution. On the other hand, stricter regulations and moderate 
behavior, which describe restrained jurisdictions, may reduce pollution (Disli et al., 
2016). According to the literature, indulgent societies have a hedonistic and permissive 
approach towards pollution and resources in general, which promotes short-term 
perspectives to acquire instant satisfaction. Thus, it’s hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3F  A higher level of indulgence will decrease the growth rate of GDP 
Hypothesis 4F  A higher level of indulgence will increase the growth rate of CO2 
emissions. 
2.4.3. Interactions between carbon prices and cultural dimensions on GDP and 
CO2 
Hofstede (1997, 2001), acknowledges that the level of economic development 
influences cultural variables in different ways and according to the EKC hypothesis, 
depending on the economic development stage of the countries, they will tend to pay 
more attention to environmental concerns or not. However, with rising income levels, 
nations are able to impose more drastic environmental policies such as higher carbon 
prices (Disli et al., 2016). Rich countries tend to be lower in power distance and high in 
individualism. Low scores of Power Distance relate “to high levels of education and high 
status occupations among those surveyed” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 105), and 58% of the 
variance in Power Distance can be predicted from national wealth, population size and 
latitude (Hofstede, 1980). Individualism, on the other hand, reflects in measures of 
social mobility, sectorial inequality, press freedom, and organization size (Hofstede, 
1980), but it also “relates Gross National Product per capita” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 231). 
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As with Power Distance, Individualism may be predicted from the basis of national 
wealth (Baskerville, 2003), which causes a relatively high correlation between these 
cultural dimensions.  
In wealthy countries the issues related to basic needs have been resolved for the 
majority of the population. Resources to care for the environment clearly exist. In rich 
societies, where strong pluralism and lively debate predominates, environmental issues 
can come more easily to the attention of the public because the ability of the climate 
change issues to enter the political agenda depends in part on cultural values of power 
distance and individualism, both of which influence political pluralism and debate. 
However, rich countries with high power distance and collectivism, deter pluralism and 
debate, environmental issues are likely to enter the national policy agenda more slowly 
(Husted, 2005). In general terms, high-power distance countries are more pollution-
intensive compared to low-power distance countries (Disli et al., 2016). That is not the 
case of poor countries, where even societies characterized by pluralistic politics and 
lively political debates will be forced to focus on more basic needs (Vogel & Kun, 1987). 
In this sense, one would expect that rich countries that implement initiatives with higher 
carbon prices are more prone to be influenced by cultural dimensions, having low power 
distance and high individualism. Thus, it is hypothesized:   
Power distance X Carbon prices 
Hypothesis 5A  Lower levels of power distance strengthen the negative relationship 
between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
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Hypothesis 6A  The higher the level of power distance, the weaker the negative 
relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 emissions growth 
rate. 
Individualism X Carbon prices 
Hypothesis 5B  The higher the level of individualism, the stronger the positive 
relationship between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
Hypothesis 6B  The higher the level of individualism, the stronger the inverse 
relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate.  
Masculinity X Carbon prices 
Rich countries have more resources to finance developing policies, incentives, 
subsidies, and strategies that help deter environmental degradation such as higher 
carbon prices (Grossman & Krueger, 1995). Due to the scarcity of resources in poorer 
countries, it’s expected that developing countries would have less resources to invest 
regardless of cultural values like femininity, which would tend to support environmental 
sustainability. Since rich countries have more resources that can be invested to address 
environmental degradation and impose stricter penalties to environmental externalities, 
they should be more sensitive to the cultural preferences of their societies in terms of 
material wealth (masculinity) or environmental care (femininity) (Husted, 2005). Thus, it 
is expected:  
Hypothesis 5C  The higher the level of masculinity, the weaker the negative 
relationship between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
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Hypothesis 6C  The lower the level of masculinity, the stronger the inverse 
relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate.  
Uncertainty avoidance X Carbon prices 
Hofstede (2001, p. 116), defines uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which 
members of a culture feel threatened by uncertainty and unknown situations.” It reflects 
the degree to which a culture tolerates ambiguity and constitutes a response to anxiety 
about the future. From an ecological perspective, some authors consider that coping 
with an unknown environmental challenge imposes a high degree of uncertainty to 
societies, and argue that societies with high uncertainty avoidance react to that 
ambiguity by promoting environmental measures that minimize those challenges (Park 
et al., 2007). On the other hand, Hofstede (2011) refers to uncertainty avoidance as a 
dimension that indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either 
uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. In high uncertainty avoiding 
cultures there are characteristics like: “intolerance of deviant persons and ideas: what is 
different is dangerous”; “in politics, citizens feel and are seen as incompetent towards 
authorities”; and “the uncertainty inherent in life is felt as a continuous threat that must 
be fought” (Hofstede, 2011, p. 10). So, in Hofstede’s perspective, uncertainty avoidance 
goes beyond preventing an undesired event; it reflects a constant attitude against 
unstructured circumstances, and to some extent toward change. In that sense, it’s 
reasonable to expect that uncertainty avoiding societies are less receptive to put high 
prices on carbon emissions, which may hurt economic growth and create ambiguous 
economic outcomes that have been achieved through the implementation of well-
structured and fine-tuned policies. Thus, it’s hypothesized:  
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Hypothesis 5D  The lower the level of uncertainty avoidance, the stronger the 
negative relationship between carbon prices and the GDP growth 
rate.  
Hypothesis 6D  The higher the level of uncertainty avoidance, the weaker the 
inverse relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate  
Long-term orientation X Carbon prices 
In long-term oriented societies, actions are driven by long-term objectives, rather than 
short-term outcomes. Short-term oriented cultures may give too little importance to the 
future effects of their current decisions, whereas long-term oriented cultures may prefer 
to sacrifice present benefits for future ones (Laibson, 1997). A transition to energy-
efficient technologies, renewable energies, and carbon-pricing instruments will likely 
cause economic pain for short-termed societies, which may be reluctant to put high 
prices on carbon emissions. Thus, its expected: 
Hypothesis 5E  The higher the level of long-term orientation, the weaker the 
relationship between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
Hypothesis 6E  Lower levels of long-term orientation weakens the negative 
relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate.  
Indulgence X Carbon prices 
Indulgent societies have a more hedonistic and permissive approach toward pollution 
and natural resources exploitation, whereas restrained societies handle carefully their 
resources with stricter norms and can reduce pollution (Disli et al., 2016), meaning that 
55 
 
indulgent societies may perceive carbon taxes as a constraint to their lifestyle. Indulgent 
societies wouldn’t adopt high carbon prices easily because the use of natural resources 
is intended for the betterment of their lifestyle.  Thus, it’s expected:       
Hypothesis 5F  A high level of indulgence weakens an inverse relationship between 
carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
Hypothesis 6F  A low level of indulgence strengthens a negative relationship 
between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate.  
2.4.4. Turning point shifts in cultural dimensions 
The hypotheses proposed reflect broad tendencies that relate cultural variables to the 
carbon-pricing instruments for the economic growth and the carbon dioxide levels. 
Nevertheless, at any specific moment, the political leaders of a given jurisdiction might 
make decisions contrary to these broad tendencies as in the case of the decision of the 
U.S. government to leave the Paris Agreement. The United States has the highest 
scores in terms of individualism, but this decision may be seen as a contradiction with 
respect to the relationship expected in the hypothesis. These cultural arguments do not 
imply that jurisdictions with certain cultural profiles move effortlessly towards 
environmental sustainability and emission reduction targets, only that in the long run 
certain cultural variables should support the carbon-pricing initiatives for environmental 
sustainability more than others (Husted, 2005). For example, although it is expected 
that jurisdictions with high power distance would prioritize economic growth over 
environmental performance, it is possible that, with higher income levels, high-power-
distance societies can impose environmental standards that more democratic cultures 
would not. This suggests that the relationship between culture, carbon pricing, carbon 
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dioxide emissions, and economic growth might be more complex than previously 





















The following chapter covers the methodology of this study. The objective of this 
research is to: 
Analyze the influence of culture and carbon-pricing initiatives on economic growth and 
CO2 emissions in 49 jurisdictions, using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions framework.  
A quasi-experimental pretest-posttest design was used for the construction of the 
dependent variables: 1) economic growth and 2) carbon dioxide emissions. The 
independent variable is the level of carbon prices and control variables are type of 
mechanism and type of jurisdiction. Culture was included as a moderator variable. 
The chapter begins by describing the research design, the sample, and the measures 
employed. Multivariate hierarchical regressions were conducted using SPSS to test the 
relationships and the moderating variables. Afterwards, a detailed description of the 
statistical methods, their validity and reliability, and the limitations were discussed.  
3.1. Quantitative Research Design 
A quantitative methods approach was employed, which includes the analysis of cross-
sectional data derived from official statistics, regulations, policies, and the cultural 
dimensions framework. Theory indicates that carbon-pricing initiatives are broadly 
adopted financial instruments to reduce emissions. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the 
jurisdictions’ climate policies was conducted, which goes hand in hand with the carbon-
pricing instruments.  
58 
 
The Hofstede’s cultural dimensions framework was used to analyze the moderating effect 
of culture on carbon-pricing initiatives, and consequently, its impact on carbon dioxide 
emissions and economic growth. By analyzing the moderating effect described above, it 
is possible to make relevant inferences that explain how culture affects climate-change 
policies and the potential impacts described before. Thus, the reason for applying 
quantitative methods in this study is because determining the cultural dimensions’ 
influence on carbon prices (independent variable) and its impact on gross domestic 
product and CO2 emissions (dependent variables) implies causal relationships. A 
quantitative approach is suitable for causality analysis, correlations, and hypothesis 
testing. 
A quasi-experimental one group pretest-posttest design was employed in the construction 
of the growth rates of economic growth and CO2 as dependent variables. Subsequently, 
a multivariate hierarchical regression was conducted, where the national scores for the 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions framework were utilized as moderators: power distance, 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance, indulgence, long-term orientation, and masculinity. 
Finally, the type of mechanism and type of jurisdiction were used as control variables to 
evaluate the relationship between culture, carbon price, economic growth, and CO2 
emissions in the model.  
3.2. Sample  
The hypotheses were tested using data from 30 jurisdictions at the national level and 19 
jurisdictions at the sub-national level, consisting of 48 different jurisdictions, with the 
exception of Switzerland, which was considered twice because it has implemented both 
types of mechanisms studied, carbon tax and emissions trading scheme. In total 49 
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jurisdictions were included in the study (Appendix A). Thirty-two emission trading 
systems were analyzed and 17 carbon tax schemes, where 16 of the jurisdictions at the 
national level have implemented carbon taxes, and 14 of them have implemented 
emissions trading schemes. Only British Columbia as a sub-national jurisdiction has 
implemented a carbon tax. All the countries of which the sub-national jurisdictions were 
studied, weren’t included as countries. The majority of the jurisdictions studied belong to 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). All of the 
jurisdictions included in the study have implemented carbon-pricing instruments, and 
the decision of whether or not to include a jurisdiction was anchored to data availability.  
3.3.  Measures 
3.3.1. Dependent variables 
The two dependent variables analyzed in this study, carbon dioxide emissions and 
economic growth, are constructed as growth rates, because they are useful to know 
how fast an indicator has risen (or declined) over a certain period. Additionally, growth 
rates allow for better comparisons across jurisdictions (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 
2018). In a sense, calculating growth rates levels the playing field between the 
jurisdictions. In this study, the reason for using growth rates in the construction of the 
dependent variables is to compare economic growth and CO2 emissions levels before 
and after carbon pricing implementation. The formula used to construct the growth-rate 
variables is  
 
where gt is the growth rate in period t, X is the variable being examined (economic 
growth and CO2 emissions) and n is the time period of interest. 
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3.3.1.1. Growth rate of CO2 emissions  
The effectiveness of carbon-pricing instruments at relatively lower costs it’s measured 
by its capacity to reduce emissions (Baranzini et al., 2000). Bearing in mind the 
previous affirmation, this study employed the growth rate of CO2 emissions between the 
previous year and the subsequent year of carbon pricing implementation as a 
dependent variable, considering that reduction in CO2 emissions is closely associated 
with a decrease in fossil fuels consumption, which is the main purpose for implementing 
carbon-pricing instruments. Additionally, the reason for selecting CO2 among other 
greenhouse gases as a dependent variable was not only because it reflects the link 
between economic activities and fossil fuel consumption but also because it’s the 
largest human contributor to human-induced climate change (Canadell et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight that the total CO2 emissions data for the 
jurisdictions analyzed in this research, doesn’t include the land use land use change 
and forestry sector (LULUCF).  
All the units for carbon dioxide emissions are in metric tons. The data for the carbon 
dioxide emissions at the national level originates from the Emissions Database for 
Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR v4.3.2) (Janssens-Maenhout et al., 2017). At 
the subnational level for the jurisdictions in Canada, the CO2 data derives from the 
Environment and Climate Change Canada Data website; for the subnational 
jurisdictions in the United States of America the data originates from the World 
Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (WRI/CAIT 2014); and the data 
for the subnational jurisdictions in China was taken from journal article: China CO2 
emission accounts 1997-2015 written by Shan et al. (2018).         
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3.3.1.2 Growth rate of Real GDP  
The growth rate of real GDP between the year before and after carbon pricing 
implementation was used as a dependent variable to identify the potential impacts of 
carbon pricing on economic growth. Real GDP was employed to avoid the inflationary 
effects on the value of all goods and services in the economies studied and because it 
provides a more accurate figure of economic growth. In addition, economic growth is a 
major concern for policymakers, GDP loss is frequently used to decide whether a 
climate policy can be finally implemented or not (Li, Wang, Zhang, & Kou, 2014).  
All the units for GDP are in U.S. dollars. The data for the real gross domestic product at 
the national level comes from the United Nations website at 2010 constant prices in 
U.S. dollars. At the subnational level for jurisdictions in Canada, the real GDP data 
derives from the Statistics Canada website at 2007 constant prices in Canadian dollars 
converted to U.S. dollars; for the subnational jurisdictions in the United States of 
America, the data originates from the Department of Numbers website at 2009 constant 
prices in U.S. dollars; and the data for the subnational jurisdictions in China originates 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China website at constant prices in yuan 
converted to U.S. dollars.        
3.3.2. Independent variable 
3.3.2.1 Carbon price 
The level of carbon prices is the predictor variable that represents the price that climate 
policies put to externalities (Aldy & Stavins, 2011). Policymakers pursue a level of 
carbon prices that are effective in reducing carbon emissions, but that does not cause 
regressive impacts on economic growth. In order to attain those characteristics, 
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policymakers restrict carbon prices’ coverage to specific sectors, usually associated 
with energy generation and consumption. The share of emissions covered by carbon 
prices implemented in the jurisdictions studied was considered in the construction of this 
variable. The carbon prices utilized in this study are the prices at the moment of 
implementation of the carbon-pricing instruments and were converted to U.S. dollars 
with the exchange rate at the implementation moment of the initiatives. The data of the 
carbon prices were taken from official websites of the initiatives, journal articles, and 
different versions of the State and Trends of Carbon Pricing and Carbon Market reports 
developed by the World Bank (2018).  All the units of carbon prices are in U.S. dollars.    
3.3.3. Control variables  
3.3.3.1 Type of mechanism  
Two types of mechanisms were included in the study, carbon taxes and emissions 
trading schemes. This categorical variable was included in the regression model as a 
dummy variable to represent group membership and determine if the type of 
mechanism studied influence the dependent variables.  The “dummy coding” assigned 0 
to carbon taxes and 1 to emissions trading schemes.  
Some authors have conducted contrasting studies between the types of carbon-pricing 
mechanisms and identifies important differences that relevant in its functions as a 
control variable according to their ability to: reduce administrative costs, tackle 
uncertainties about damages from emissions and costs abatement, control volatility of 
prices, avoid “emissions leakage”,, achieve budget discipline, achieve useful linkages 
across jurisdictions, achieve broad sector coverage, and gain political support (Goulder 
& Schein, 2013).      
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3.3.3.2 Type of jurisdiction 
Two types of jurisdictions were included in the study, jurisdictions at the sub-national 
level (provinces, states, etc.) and country level jurisdictions. This categorical variable 
was included in the regression model as a dummy variable to represent group 
membership and determine if the type of jurisdiction influence the response variables. 
The “dummy coding” assigned 0 to national jurisdictions and 1 to sub-national 
jurisdictions.   
Several studies indicated that climate policy development at the national level, and 
resulting negotiations amongst them, has produced mixed results. Moreover, power is 
shifting away from the central state to a diverse array of subnational and regional 
actors. On the other hand, increasing subnational governance of environmental issues, 
with a particular focus on climate change as an issue that requires ‘integrated action at 
multiple levels of government’ has become relevant for the implementation of carbon-
pricing instruments. In this regard, the relevance in considering the type of jurisdiction 
as a control variable consists in the differences between the national and the 
subnational levels with respect to: changes at multiple sociotechnical levels, loci of 
innovation, institutional barriers to change, and the challenges faced in attempting to 
govern or steer shifts toward more sustainable pathways (Burch et al., 2014). 
3.3.4. Moderating variables 
3.3.4.1 Cultural dimensions 
A number of authors (Cox et al., 2011; Disli et al., 2016; Halkos & Tzeremes, 2013; 
Husted, 2005; Lahuerta-Otero & González-Bravo, 2017; Onel & Mukherjee, 2014; Park 
et al., 2007; Pelau & Pop, 2018; Peng & Lin, 2009; Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Tata & 
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Prasad, 2015; Vachon, 2010) have used the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions framework 
as moderators or mediators to study relationships between culture and a broad diversity 
of environmental issues.  
The Hofstede’s cultural dimension variables of power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, long-term orientation, indulgence, and uncertainty avoidance were applied 
to all the jurisdictions at the national level, and they were measured using data 
published in the website Hofstede Insights (www.hofstede-insights.com) for all the 
jurisdictions, using information at the country level. Hofstede Insights was created in 
2017 from a merger between Itim International and The Hofstede Centre. The Hofstede 
measures of culture are widely cited and used by many scholars. The Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions country scores are expressed as between 0 and 100 (Onel & 
Mukherjee, 2014). 
One problem with the use of Hofstede’s measures is that he measures cultural 
differences at the national level (Husted, 2005) and not all nations are culturally 
homogeneous (Enz, 1986). Significant differences may exist between regions in sub-
national jurisdictions and also between the people who participate in the processes of 
climate policymaking. In addition, the Hofstede’s data assumes that culture is very 
stable and changes very slowly. Hofstede (2001, p. 36) predicted that relative national 
cultural scores would not change substantially “until at least 2100”. Although that 
assumption is plausible, it is disputed by some authors (McSweeney, 2002).  
Despite these limitations, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are used in order to apply a 
well-known and validated framework for analyzing culture that will assist in the 
accumulation of knowledge (Enz, 1986). Additionally, a comprehensive review based on 
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Hofstede’s work found that the cultural dimensions have largely been supported by 
evidence in replications and extensions (Søndergaard, 1994).   
3.4. Data Analysis 
This study employed SPSS to conduct statistical analyses, addressing the influence of 
culture on carbon prices and its effects on economic growth and carbon dioxide 
emissions. The data analysis consisted of an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis with 
a hierarchical regression method to explain the relationships and the moderation effects. 
A quasi-experimental single-group pretest-posttest design with a within-participants 
approach (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) was used for the construction of the 
dependent variables, meaning that the data collected for the economic growth and CO2 
emissions growth rates considers one year before the carbon pricing implementation (i.e., 
the pretest) and one year after the carbon pricing implementation (i.e., the posttest). The 
measures used in the pretest and the posttest are the same, and changes in the 
dependent variables from pretest to posttest are interpreted to reflect the effectiveness of 
the carbon pricing implementation (independent variable).  
A single-group pretest–posttest design does not have control or comparison groups. The 
logical basis of the pretest–posttest indicates that if Y (a change in the dependent 
variable) regularly follows X (an independent variable), then X is sufficient for Y to happen 
and could be a cause of Y (i.e., if X, then Y) (Frey, 2018).  
Although this design allows researchers to examine some outcome of interest prior to 
some treatment, it does not eliminate the possibility that the observed changes might 
have occurred regardless of the treatment (Salkind, 2010). Including a pretest measure 
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is an improvement over the posttest-only research design; however, this design is still 
relatively weak in terms of internal validity. As a result, a causal inference between a 
change in the dependent and independent variables would be subject to rival 
explanations in the design. In other words, the internal validity of the pretest–posttest 
design is subject to threats (Marsden & Torgerson, 2012). Also, the longer the time lapse 
between the pretest and posttest, the harder it is to rule out alternative explanations for 
any observed differences, which is the main reason to have included only the previous 
and the subsequent year to carbon pricing implementation in the study (Salkind, 2010). 
Additionally, it’s a cost-effective way to determine the effectiveness of an intervention 
(Frey, 2018).  
The most important threat to internal validity for the design employed in this study is 
history. History could be responsible for any observed difference between the pretest and 
posttest. The threat of history consists of a situation where many events in addition to the 
intervention may occur between administration of the pretest and the posttest and may 
account for some or even all of the observed changes (Frey, 2018). These events might 
occur either within or outside the context of intervention, which could be the case of the 
GDP’s growth rate, where many factors may affect the economic growth of a jurisdiction; 
such as economic crises, population changes, technology improvements or regulations 
and laws toward economic activity. A similar situation experiences the carbon dioxide’s 
growth rate, which in the absence of climate policies, has a positive relationship with 
economic growth (Jaunky, 2011), meaning that a rise in energy consumption to produce 
the additional output leads to a greater generation of emissions.  
67 
 
To rule out a potential influence of history as a threat, it was verified that measures for 
both dependent variables consistently changed in the predicted direction according to the 
literature, denoting that economic growth is not significantly impacted and CO2 emissions 
are effectively reduced as shown in Figure 3 (Baranzini et al., 2000). Additionally, since 
the outcome variables are continuous, the data obtained from the one-group pretest-
posttest design were analyzed with the dependent-means t-test (paired-difference t-test) 
(Appendix B), which indicated that the difference between groups (pretest and posttest) 
for both dependent variables is statistically significant (Salkind, 2010). 
Many theoretical frameworks in the social sciences focus on causal models. These 
models specify the effects of one or more independent variables on one or more 
dependent variables or outcome variables. On the basis of the literature review and 
hypothesis construction, the framework employed in this research is a moderated 
causal relationship (illustrated in Figure 2). 
A moderated causal relationship, as shown in Figure 1, is one in which the relationship 
between X and Y is moderated by a third variable, Z. In other words, the nature of the 
relationship between X and Y varies, depending on the value of Z. Moderated 
relationships often are called interaction effects, although precise conceptualizations of 










Figure 1. Moderated causal relationship. Adapted from “Interaction effects in multiple 
regression” by J. Jaccard and R. Turrisi, 2003, California, CA. Copyright 2003, by SAGE 
Publications, Inc.  
This study explores the moderating effect of the cultural variables on carbon prices and 
determines its influence on economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions as response 
variables. In order to test hypotheses associated with the moderating effect described 
before,  interaction terms were created, by multiplying the cultural variables by the level 
of carbon prices (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The interaction terms were relatively highly 
correlated, high levels of multicollinearity were detected. Multicollinearity causes that the 
estimates of the coefficients of the independent variables become sensitive to the data 
used (Baron & Kenny, 1986). To correct this problem, the centering procedure proposed 
by Russo and Fouts (1997) was applied. This method involves “de-meaning” or 
“centering” the variables by subtracting their means from the variable’s value for each 
observation. This method helps to reduce the problem of multicollinearity with the 
interaction variables.  
Accordingly, after the moderating variables were defined, a multivariate hierarchical 
regression with an enter regression method was used in testing the hypotheses, 
considering that is relevant knowing if adding one or more predictor variables to an 
existing regression equation will significantly increase the predictability of the criterion 
(Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003b). The amount of incremental explained variance is typically 
evaluated by subtracting the squared multiple correlation in the original equation from 
the squared multiple correlation in the expanded equations, as the models 
operationalized in this research. The difference in the squared multiple correlations is 
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the amount of incremental explained variance due to the additional predictors (Jaccard 
& Turrisi, 2003a).  
Following the methodology indicated in the literature, first, the variables were tested on 
the effects to control for type of mechanism and type of jurisdiction, followed by adding 
the main effect of the level of carbon prices on economic growth and CO2 emissions, 
and the effects of contingency moderators such as the cultural dimensions. The product 
terms of the level of carbon prices with the cultural dimension variables, were added 
afterward to the model to determine whether there was a significant increase in the 
predictability of the criterion variable (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003b).This allowed the study 
to examine the contribution of the cultural dimensions.  
The following regressions were run in stages: 
 
Model 1. [∆GDP/∆CO2] = f (type of mechanism, type of jurisdiction) 
Model 2. [∆GDP/∆CO2] = f (type of mechanism, type of jurisdiction, level of carbon 
prices, cultural dimensions) 
Model 3. [∆GDP/∆CO2] = f (cultural dimensions, type of mechanism, type of jurisdiction, 
level of carbon prices, interactions between carbon prices and 






                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       








Figure 2. Model of direct and moderator effects 
Carbon prices GDP Growth rate 
(DV1) 
CO2 Growth rate 
(DV2) 
Moderating variables  
Cultural dimensions 
A. Power distance                                          D.  Uncertainty avoidance 
B. Individualism                                              E.   Long-term orientation 
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3.5. Validity and reliability 
Several tests were conducted to examine the validity and reliability of the data and 
results in the study. According to Joppe’s  2000 study (as cited in Golafshani, 2003), 
validity determines whether the research truly measures that which it was intended to 
measure or how truthful the research results are; and defines reliability as the extent to 
which results are consistent over time, represent accurately the total population under 
study, and if they can be reproduced under a similar methodology. According to these 
concepts, data were screened to detect outliers and missing values, then tested for 
normality, multicollinearity, and homoskedasticity (Appendix C). 
Outliers can mislead the regression results. When an outlier is involved in the study, it 
pulls the regression line towards itself. This can result in a solution that is more precise 
for the outlier, but less precise for all of the other cases in the data set (Kannan & 
Manoj, 2015). To avoid this effect on the results, a combination of three multivariate 
outlier detection methods of distance measures was employed: Mahalanobis distance 
(MDi), Cook’s distance (Di), and Leverage point (hi). The criterion applied to outlier 
detection with the combined methods’ approach, indicates that observations detected 
by two or more methods as highly deviated from the rest of the data are considered 
outliers (Kannan & Manoj, 2015). No outliers were detected and no missing values were 
found using SPSS tools.  
The Shapiro-Wilk (SW) test was used to examine normality in the data. The SW test is 
the most well-known regression test and is considered to have good power properties 
over a wide range of asymmetric distributions. As stated by Yap and Sim (2011, p. 
2153), “if the researcher suspects that the distribution is asymmetric (i.e. skewed) then 
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the SW test is the best test”; the SW is a solid option for normality testing. The variables 
analyzed with the SW test are a little kurtotic and skewed, but they show non-significant 
p-values (p>.05), meaning that the data is in general terms normally distributed. 
Multicollinearity was analyzed by the variable inflation factor test (VIF) and the 
Pearson’s correlation matrix. According to the literature, VIF values between 4 and 10 
reflect a significant correlation (O’brien, 2007). Items with VIF values higher than 10 are 
considered multilinear and the corresponding variables are removed (or combined 
together by taking the value of the mean) (O’brien, 2007). A cut-off value of 0.8 was 
used for the correlation matrix (Table 2) to determine the multicollinearity. No 
multicollinearity was identified among the variables studied. 
Heteroskedasticity accounts for the loss in efficiency in using ordinary least squares 
(OLS), which may be substantial and, more importantly, the biases in estimated 
standard errors may lead to invalid inferences (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). The data were 
examined for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan and the Koenker tests. The 
results of both tests failed to reject the null hypotheses (H0: homoskedasticity), showing 
non-significant p-values (p>.05), and indicating that there are no heteroskedastic 
disturbances in the data.  
3.6. Limitations  
The study analyzed 49 jurisdictions at the national and the sub-national level. An 
important limitation was the unavailability of cultural distances’ scores for the sub-national 
jurisdictions. With the exception of Quebec, the rest of the sub-national jurisdictions 
utilized national scores. Another aspect is that the majority of the jurisdictions included in 
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this research belong to the OECD, implying that the findings of the study may not be 
generalizable to other jurisdictions.   
Jurisdictions that have implemented carbon-pricing initiatives and were initially 
considered for this study, weren’t included, because critical data weren’t available for 
those particular jurisdictions, such as carbon prices or cultural dimensions scores. 
Another reason is that some carbon-pricing initiatives have been recently implemented 
and the data that reflect the effects of carbon prices on economic growth and CO2 
emissions are not available yet. Only jurisdictions that have implemented carbon-pricing 


















This chapter presents the findings of the study. First, it begins with an overall 
description of the effects of carbon-pricing instruments on economic growth and carbon 
dioxide emissions, depicting its respective overall trends.  Second, the results of the 
hierarchical regression analyses are presented, beginning with the results of the 
regression of carbon prices and cultural dimensions on the gross domestic product 
growth rate and the interactions between the cultural variables and the levels of the 
carbon prices. Third, the chapter finalizes with the results of the hierarchical regression 
of the independent variables and the moderating variables on the carbon dioxide’s 
growth rate, including its respective interactions. 
4.1. GDP and CO2 growth rate’s trends  
The wealth of jurisdictions is a factor in explaining their amounts of GHG emissions 
and will also impact their ability to afford various emissions reduction strategies. 
There is a general trend of increasing emissions with gross domestic product (GDP), 
although with substantial variability, depending on the implementation of climate 
policies (Kennedy, Ibrahim, & Hoornweg, 2014). The average trend of the 49 
jurisdictions included in the study depicts the impact of the carbon-pricing policies’ 
implementation, showing that the CO2 emissions decrease, while the GDP increases 
after the implementation of carbon-pricing instruments, as it’s shown in figure 3. The 
CO2 and GDP average trends presented in Figure 3 show the overall tendencies in 
the 49 jurisdictions analyzed, and in general terms represents the influence of 
carbon-pricing instruments on the aggregated-data curves of GDP and CO2 
emissions.   
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Figure 3. Average trends of GDP and CO2 emissions growth rates in the jurisdictions 
studied, before and after the implementation of carbon pricing 
 
Conversely, countries lacking of strategies to reduce emissions, such as carbon pricing, 
show a positive relationship between economic growth and CO2 emissions (Bekhet et 
al., 2017; Jaunky, 2011; Narayan & Narayan, 2010). 
Nonetheless, when the jurisdictions’ growth rates, before and after carbon pricing 
implementation, are analyzed individually, 7 of them present a small decrease in the 
GDP rate: Connecticut, Finland, Iceland, Maine, Poland, Rhode Island, and Sweden; 
and 14 jurisdictions show an increasing rate of CO2 emissions: Alberta, Chongqing, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Japan, Latvia, Luxemburg, Portugal, Korea, Rhode 
Island, Slovenia, Spain, and Ukraine. The purpose of Figure 3 is to provide an overview 
of a 5-year trend (two years before and after carbon pricing implementation) for 
economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions in the jurisdictions studied, 






























































dependent variables, whereas explicit carbon prices might not reflect entirely these 
impacts. Furthermore, this section introduces the Results Chapter, which encompasses 
the results of the hierarchical regressions analyses for both dependent variables.   
4.2. Results of hierarchical regression analyses   
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables. The 
correlation matrix suggests a moderate level of collinearity between power distance and 
individualism. But such moderate levels should not be damaging to the assumptions of 
OLS regression (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977; O’brien, 2007), the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) indicate that they are in acceptable ranges, below 10 (Akinwande, Dikko, 
& Samson, 2015; O’brien, 2007), which are presented in Tables 3 and 4 along with the 
regression results. The relatively high correlation between power distance and 
individualism is acknowledged by Hofstede (1997), and is caused because Power 
distance and Individualism can be explained from the basis of national wealth 
(Baskerville, 2003). Hofstede (1997) notes that this relation disappears when economic 
growth is held constant. In this study the correlation values between power distance and 
individualism are below the cut-off point of 0.8.   
 An examination of the Mahalanobis distance, Cook’s distance, and Leverage point 
indicated no multivariate outliers in the data (Kannan & Manoj, 2015). A Shapiro-Wilk 
test indicated that the data in general terms are normally distributed (Yap & Sim, 2011). 
And finally, the Breusch-Pagan and Koenker tests showed that the data are not affected 
by heteroskedasticity disturbances (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). The results of these tests 
indicated that the data were suitable to run the regression analyses (Appendix D).  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N=49) 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.Growth rate CO2 -.0305 .07975                 
2.Growth rate GDP .083 .114 .368**                
3.Carbon price 14.124 12.934 .237 -.042               
4. Power distance 48.939 19.304 .148 .507** -.314*              
5. Individualism 62.347 25.329 -.419** -.588** .040 -.742**             
6. Masculinity 51.796 21.012 -.368** .073 -.157 .131 .018            
7. Uncertainty 
avoidance 57.612 21.854 .192 -.266 .117 .253 -.216 -.066           
8. Long term 
orientation 51.674 24.387 .322* .618** .173 .446** -.617** .112 .070          
9. Indulgence 52.592 20.517 -.284* -.599** .137 -.604** .651** .047 -.192 -.691**         
10. Type of 
jurisdiction .39 .492 -.286* .209 -.487** .180 .131 .364* -.578** -.159 .059        
11. Type of 
mechanism .63 .487 -.245 .203 .022 .035 .154 .489** -.280 .083 .043 .520**       
12. CP*PD -.288 .808 -.275 -.146 -.193 -.178 .453** .123 -.016 -.202 .127 .247 .361*      
13. CP*IND .040 .835 .431** .386** .144 .471** -.575** -.165 .086 .430** -.365** -.286* -.312* -.636**     
14. CP*MAS -.145 1.083 .055 .202 -.188 .105 -.122 .180 .317* .088 -.362* -.094 -.001 .064 .002    
15. CP*UNA .116 1.0372 -.078 .308* .226 -.011 .069 .356* -.074 .158 -.051 .257 .653** .508** -.408** .217   
16. CP*LTO .171 .838 -.374** -.453** .041 -.184 .419** .138 .186 -.298* .392** .109 .239 .237 -.403** .014 .156  
17. CP*IVR .133 .957 .302* .264 .045 .115 -.313* -.419** -.054 .350* -.395** -.229 -.428** -.506** .503** -.078 -.447** -.548** 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
PD: power distance; IND: individualism; MAS: masculinity; UNA: uncertainty avoidance; LTO: long-term orientation; IVR: indulgence 
The interactions are between the carbon price and the cultural dimensions, which are centered. 
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4.2.1. Results of hierarchical regression analysis including interaction effects 
with cultural dimensions on GDP’s growth rate  
In order to determine the influence of carbon prices on GDP and the moderating effects 
of the six cultural dimensions, Table 3 presents the results of regressing the GDP’s 
growth rate on the carbon prices and the six cultural dimensions in the second model. 
The regression starts by controlling for the type of jurisdiction, and the type of 
mechanism in the first model. Finally, the third model of the hierarchical regression 
included the interactions between the carbon prices and the six cultural dimensions. 
Model 1 in Table 3 shows that there are not significant relationships between the GDP’s 
growth rate and the control variables, type of jurisdiction and type of mechanism.  The 
model’s adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R2) is 0.015 and the F-statistic is 
not significant (p>0.05). 
In Model 2 the control variables remain insignificant. In this model, carbon price was 
included as independent variable along with the six cultural dimensions. The 
relationship between carbon prices and the GDP’s growth rate was not significant and 
its sign is opposite the expected direction. This indicates that Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported, which proposed that carbon prices would negatively influence the economic 
growth rate of a jurisdiction in the short run. Furthermore, a significant and negative 
relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and the GDP’s growth rate was identified 
(β = -.415, t (39) = -2.906, p<0.01), supporting Hypothesis 3D, which indicates that low 
uncertainty avoiding jurisdictions have higher economic growth rates. Long-term 




Table 3. Hierarchical regression including interactions with cultural dimensions on GDP 
 GDP growth rate (DV1) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 

















































Carbon price x power distance 
  -.054 
(3.380) 
Carbon price x individualism 
  .135 
(3.579) 
Carbon price x masculinity 
  .197 
(1.999) 
Carbon price x uncertainty avoidance 
  .367* 
(3.794) 
Carbon price x long term orientation 
  -.154 
(2.229) 
Carbon price x indulgence 
  .026 
(3.166) 
Adjusted R2 .015 .586 .673 
∆R2  .607 .112 
F-test for ∆R2  8.544** 7.587** 
N=49. Standardized coefficients are reported. Variance inflation factors are in parentheses. 





with the GDP’s growth rate. Power distance, Individualism, and Masculinity are not 
significant and its sign is opposite the expected direction. The introduction of these 
variables explains additional significance variance compared to the base model 
(∆R2=.607) and the significant F-statistic (F (9,39) = 8.544, p<.001).  
Model 3 adds the interactions between carbon prices and the six cultural dimensions. 
The control variables remain insignificant. The relationship between Uncertainty 
Avoidance and the GDP’s growth rate continues being significant and negative in this 
model (β = -.388, t (33) = -2.534, p=0.02). Additionally, there is a positive significant 
interaction between Uncertainty Avoidance and carbon prices (β = .367, t (33) = 2.284, 
p=0.03). Hence, Hypothesis 5D is supported, which indicates that a lower level of 
Uncertainty Avoidance strengthens the negative relationship between carbon prices and 
the GDP’s growth rate. The introduction of these interactions explains the increasing 
significance variance compared to Model 2 in Table 3 (∆R2=.112), and the significant F-
statistic (F (15,33) = 7.587, p<.001). 
The interpretation of the signs for the interaction terms is counterintuitive. In this case, 
the sign of the interaction between Uncertainty Avoidance and the carbon prices is 
positive, but since the interpretation of the interaction effects is complicated at best, 
these interaction effects were examined graphically, using the simple slopes procedure 
described by Aken and West (1991). The simple slopes method requires to plot values 
one standard deviation above the mean and one standard deviation below the mean. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship of centered carbon prices values at low, average, and 
high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance, depicting that low levels of Uncertainty avoidance 
strengthen a negative relationship between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate, as 
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indicated in the Hypothesis 5D, which presents the largest slope. At average levels of 
Uncertainty avoidance, the interaction depicts a slightly negative slope; and at higher 
levels of uncertainty avoidance, the relationship between carbon prices and the GDP 
growth rate becomes positive. On the one hand the positive sign of the interaction term 
indicates that the negative relationship between carbon prices and GDP increases at 
lower levels of Uncertainty Avoidance (larger slope), but on the other hand a positive 
relationship between carbon prices and GDP increases at higher levels of Uncertainty 
Avoidance (smaller slope). This result suggests that there are two significant regions of 
the interaction, one at high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance and the other one at lower 
levels of Uncertainty Avoidance. In other words, an increasing or decreasing growth rate 
of GDP at high or low carbon prices depends on the levels of Uncertainty Avoidance.  
 
Figure 4. Interaction effects between Uncertainty Avoidance and carbon prices on 
GDP’s growth rate.   
 
This still supports Hypothesis 5D, but also a region of the interaction where high levels of 
Uncertainty Avoidance and low carbon prices increase GDP. However, considering the 
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region with a larger slope. Nonetheless, it’s safe to say that as carbon prices increase 
the GDP’s growth rate decreases more rapidly for those jurisdictions with lower levels of 
Uncertainty Avoidance compared to those with higher levels of Uncertainty Avoidance. 
 
4.2.2. Results of hierarchical regression analysis including interaction effects 
with cultural dimensions on CO2 emissions’ growth rate  
In order to explain the influence of carbon prices on CO2 emissions and the moderating 
effects of the six cultural dimensions, Table 4 presents the results of regressing the CO2 
emissions’ growth rate on the carbon prices and the six cultural dimensions and 
controlling for type of jurisdiction and type of mechanism. Lastly, the third stage of the 
hierarchical regression included the interactions between the carbon prices and the six 
cultural dimensions.  
Model 1 in Table 4 shows that there are no significant relationships between the CO2 
emissions’ growth rate and the control variables, type of jurisdiction and type of 
mechanism. The direction of both relationships is negative. The model’s adjusted 
coefficient of determination (adjusted R2) is 0.055 and the F-statistic is not significant 
(p>.05).  
In Model 2 the control variables remain insignificant. In this model, carbon price was 
included as independent variable together with the six cultural dimensions. The 
relationship between carbon prices and CO2 emissions’ growth rate was not significant, 
and its sign is opposite the expected direction. This indicates that Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported, which proposed that carbon prices would negatively influence the CO2 
emissions’ growth rate of a jurisdiction.   
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression including interactions with cultural dimensions on CO2 
 CO2 emissions growth rate (DV2) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 

















































Carbon price x power distance 
  -.069 
(3.380) 
Carbon price x individualism 
  .413 
(3.579) 
Carbon price x masculinity 
  .014 
(1.999) 
Carbon price x uncertainty avoidance 
  .152 
(3.794) 
Carbon price x long term orientation 
  -.335 
(2.229) 
Carbon price x indulgence 
  -.244 
(3.166) 
Adjusted R2 .055 .245 .292 
∆R2  .293 .126 
F-test for ∆R2  2.733* 2.317* 
N=49. Standardized coefficients are reported. Variance inflation factors are in parentheses. 






Moreover, a significant and negative relationship between Individualism and the CO2 
emissions’ growth rate was identified (β = -.517, t (39) = -2.177, p=0.04), supporting 
Hypothesis 4B, which indicated that highly individualistic jurisdictions have lower CO2 
emissions’ growth rates. Additionally, Model 2 shows a significant and negative 
relationship between Masculinity and CO2 emissions’ growth rate (β = -.358, t (39) = -
2.276, p=0.03) in the opposite direction as expected. Hence, Hypothesis 4C is not 
supported. Power distance, Long-term Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, and 
Indulgence are not significantly related to the CO2 emissions’ growth rate. The 
introduction of these variables explains the additional significance variance compared to 
the base model (∆R2=.245) and the significant F-statistic (F (9,39) = 2.733, p<.05). 
Model 3 in Table 4 adds the interactions between carbon prices and the six cultural 
dimensions. Type of mechanism and type of jurisdiction control variables remain 
insignificant. The negative relationship between Masculinity and the CO2 emissions’ 
growth rate remains significant (β = -.477, t (33) = -2.724, p=.01), and in the opposite 
direction as expected. Individualism becomes insignificant but remains in the expected 
direction. Uncertainty Avoidance becomes significant and in the expected direction (β = 
.506, t (33) = -2.241, p=.04), supporting Hypothesis 4D, which indicated that the lower 
the levels of Uncertainty Avoidance, the lower the levels of CO2 emissions. Power 
distance, Long-term orientation, and Indulgence remain insignificant. There are no 
significant interactions in this model. Nonetheless, the introduction of these interactions 
explains the increasing significance variance compared to Model 2 (∆R2=.126) and the 




5. Discussion  
This chapter begins by examining the effects of the carbon prices on the two dependent 
variables: economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions. Following with an analysis in 
deeper detail of the impacts of carbon-pricing instruments and cultural dimensions on 
the real GDP growth rate and the hypotheses associated with this economic growth. 
Finally, the chapter addresses the findings of the relationships between the independent 
and the moderating variables with the carbon dioxide emissions’ growth rate.    
5.1. The influence of carbon prices on real GDP and CO2 emissions 
As described in the literature, one of the major challenges that policymakers face while 
designing climate change policies is deciding on the correct carbon price to achieve 
desired outcomes from these policies. Determining carbon prices is a difficult task, 
especially, considering the profound uncertainties involved in estimating the economic 
value of negative impacts caused by climate change, the imperfect information about 
climatological events, and the extent of the impacts (Bowen, 2011). However, carbon 
pricing is the best tool available for market-based strategies to reduce emissions, and 
carbon prices constitute the structural underpinnings of climate change policies (Aldy & 
Pizer, 2016). Carbon prices are intended to efficiently promote a low-carbon economy 
by reflecting the marginal cost of emitting an extra unit of greenhouse gas emissions 
and are expected not to produce regressive effects on economic growth and productive 
activities (Iyer et al., 2018). Bearing in mind the relevance of carbon prices, it’s 
important to recognize that they are not always directly comparable across the carbon-
pricing initiatives because of the differences in terms of the sectors covered, the share 
of emissions covered, greenhouse gases covered, emission allocation methods applied, 
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specific exemptions, and different compensation methods. These differences affect not 
only the comparability of carbon prices between the initiatives but also the efficiency of 
the carbon-pricing instruments and their impacts on economic growth and carbon 
dioxide emissions. For this study, the share of emissions covered and the currency 
exchange rates at the moment of implementation were considered to estimate the 
carbon prices’ impacts on emissions and real GDP, converting the explicit carbon prices 
into effective carbon rates. Other characteristics of carbon prices are strongly 
dependent on the nature of the policy instruments applied, and the particularities of 
each jurisdiction, which might constitute a limitation in terms of comparability. For 
example, Sweden has the highest carbon tax rates among the jurisdictions analyzed in 
this study, which is the main reason why the absolute decrease of CO2 emissions in 
Sweden is larger than  in other jurisdictions (Lin & Li, 2011). Nevertheless, as the 
carbon tax rate for manufacturing industries is one half of the general level in Sweden, 
its impact on mitigation of the industrial sector is limited. Between 1990 and 2008, the 
total emissions in Sweden decreased by 13%. The CO2 emissions in the manufacturing 
and the construction industries went down by 13.3%, while that of the iron and steel 
industry increased by 27%. Additionally, due to the high carbon tax rate, the CO2 
emissions in the residential sector decreased by 81%, which is the largest decrease in 
emissions among all sectors in Sweden (Lin & Li, 2011). This example reflects the 
differences of explicit carbon prices in explaining the impacts of carbon-pricing 
instruments on GDP and emissions, and the variability of those impacts across 
jurisdictions. Explicit carbon prices send an important price signal to markets, but also 
depend on the methods applied and the objectives of the climate policies to reflect 
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accurately the ultimate effects of carbon-pricing instruments. The overall impacts of 
carbon-pricing instruments are shown in Figure 3, depicting trends of increasing GDPs 
while CO2 emissions are decreasing.  
Keeping in mind these differences between the explicit carbon prices and the carbon-
pricing instruments is important to understand the impacts on the dependent variables 
employed in the hierarchical regression analyses for this study.    
5.2. Impacts of carbon prices and cultural dimensions on GDP 
The literature indicates that in the absence of climate policies, when the economic 
growth rate increases, the environmental performance indicators are negatively 
affected, which is in accord with the Environmental Kuznets Curve for jurisdictions in 
early stages of economic development, indicating that jurisdictions in those stages of 
economic growth display a poor environmental performance, improving in later stages 
(Stern, 2003). The majority of the jurisdictions analyzed in this study are developed 
ones and belong to the OECD, within an income segment that is consistent with the 
EKC (Aldy, 2005). However, it’s important to keep in mind that this study employed the 
growth rate of real GDP as dependent variable and not the size of GDP. Thus, the 
regression results were expected to suggest that those jurisdictions with the largest 
economic growth rates have poor environmental performance, which in this case are 
some of the fastest growing economies, such as the Chinese provinces, Korea, and 
some countries from Eastern Europe like Latvia, Czech Republic, and Estonia. For 
example, Chongqing GDP’s growth was 11% in 2015 (Global Times, 2016), the year 
after the ETS initiative implementation. This reflects that the individual results described 
in the CO2 and GDP trends section are in line with the EKC, indicating that jurisdictions 
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with faster economic growth present a positive relationship between GDP and the level 
of emissions. 
With respect to the regression results, in the first stage of the hierarchical regression on 
the real GDP’s growth rate dependent variable, none of the control variables shows a 
significant relationship, indicating that the type of jurisdiction and the type of mechanism 
are not related to the GDP’s growth rate. This result was counterintuitive, at least with 
respect to the type of jurisdiction, considering that the carbon revenue management 
strategies were expected to have a stronger impact in the local economies at the 
subnational level compared to those at the national level.  
Hypothesis 1, which proposed a negative relationship between the level of carbon 
prices and the economic growth rate, wasn’t supported. Although, the coefficients are 
small and close to zero, the direction of the relationship was opposite as expected in the 
first regression state, and not statistically significant in the two regression stages where 
the variable carbon price was included. The expected results were based on empirical 
studies, which indicate that carbon pricing is an effective policy tool because it can 
reduce carbon emissions with little negative impact on economic growth (Lu et al., 
2010). However, it is appropriate to emphasize that the GDP of a jurisdiction depends 
on many factors and it’s difficult to explain its dynamics without considering other 
macroeconomic aspects that have relevant influence on economic growth. With that 
being said, an alternative explanation for observed results, may be that policy design 
features related to carbon revenue management play a key role in minimizing the 
negative economic impacts of a carbon tax or an ETS. Moreover, the distributional 
impacts and impacts on competitiveness have important implications not only for 
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fairness or distributive justice but also for political feasibility (Goulder & Parry, 2008), 
implying that policymakers pay special attention to this potential effects of carbon 
pricing. Accordingly, several studies agree that welfare and distributional implications of 
carbon prices significantly depend on how carbon revenue recycling is defined in 
policies (Arlinghaus, 2015). For example, Chateau and Saint-Martin (2013) found that 
an adequate redistribution of carbon revenue can impact positively the labor market, 
especially in the clean energy sector. However, other authors argue that no consensus 
has been established regarding the progressivity or regressivity of the carbon pricing 
itself (Caron, Cohen, Brown, & Reilly, 2018), which depends on the different 
approaches employed in the policy designs. For instance, Goulder and Hafstead (2013) 
found that a tax equivalent to $10 per ton of CO2 starting in 2013 and increasing by 5% 
per year until 2040 reduced GDP by 0.56% when revenues are returned in lump-sum 
fashion to households, 0.33% when revenues are used to reduce personal tax rates, 
and 0.24% when revenues are used to reduce corporate tax rates. This suggests that 
negative impacts on economic growth vary widely depending on the design and the 
objectives of the carbon-pricing instrument. Furthermore, the regression analysis results 
suggest that explicit carbon prices may be limited in explaining impacts on real GDP. 
Although, this study considered some features of the carbon pricing designs, such as 
the share of emissions covered by carbon prices, the type of emissions covered (CO2 
emissions), and the currency exchange rates of carbon prices in their respective 
jurisdictions; the study didn't consider other specific elements of the carbon-pricing 
policies implemented in the jurisdictions. 
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It can be seen from the above analysis that, despite carbon prices are core elements of 
carbon-pricing policies, they might not reflect accurately all the effects of carbon taxes 
or emissions trading schemes on economic growth. For instance, explicit carbon prices 
are not able to manifest the influence of carbon revenue management measures to 
reduce the negative impacts on competitiveness, household incomes, and EITE 
sectors. Therefore, they only show a partial vision of the net cost to society of emissions 
abatement; consequently, the lack of statistical significance of carbon prices with 
respect to real GDP impacts is attributed to measures such as exemptions and free-
allocation of allowances. On the other hand, Figure 3 shows clearly that carbon-pricing 
instruments achieved the intended outcome of not affecting negatively the GDP trend in 
the majority of the jurisdictions, which is consistent with the literature.  
Hypothesis 3D was supported, which indicated that lower levels of Uncertainty 
Avoidance promote higher economic growth rates, suggesting that those jurisdictions 
open to innovation and with flexible legal frameworks that promote entrepreneurism, 
technological innovation, and business development, have economies that grow more 
than jurisdictions with high uncertainty avoidance levels.  
Among the jurisdictions with the lowest levels of Uncertainty avoidance are Denmark, 
Sweden, the Chinese provinces, UK, and Ireland, followed by the U.S. subnational 
jurisdictions, which coincide with some of the larger economies observed in the study. 
These societies have the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, and a tendency to 
manage adequately ambiguity in unstructured environments. This suggests a certain 
degree of comfort in dealing with investment risks and relatively new businesses, such 
as renewable energies (Papamarcos & Watson, 2006). For instance, Ireland’s carbon 
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tax is notable for its ambitious price per ton of CO2 covering almost all sectors not 
covered by the EU ETS. Although the Irish carbon tax was mildly regressive based on 
income and household characteristics for home heating expenditures, it was 
progressively distributed across the income spectrum for electricity and petrol use 
(Farrell, 2017). This tax system is also known for its implementation during the global 
recession and a time of peak austerity in Ireland, which is a remarkable indication of low 
Uncertainty Avoidance because of the ambiguity involved at that time. Despite the 
adverse conditions, the carbon tax revenue represented for Ireland’s economy about 
12.4% of the cumulative tax increases between 2010 and 2012 (Convery, Dunne, & 
Joyce, 2013) and has generated over €2 billion in revenue so far. 
The results suggest that low Uncertainty Avoidance levels are relevant in the context of 
carbon pricing with respect to economic growth, because it involves the adoption of new 
and innovative technologies. On the other hand, the potentially regressive effects of 
carbon pricing on the economic growth can be reverted with an adequate 
implementation of carbon revenue management strategies, but require a certain degree 
of tolerance toward uncertain economic conditions.   
Hypothesis 5D was supported. This hypothesis reflects an interaction term between 
carbon prices and uncertainty avoidance on economic growth, which indicates that at 
lower levels of uncertainty avoidance the relationship between carbon prices and 
economic growth becomes more negative. This result suggests that jurisdictions with 
low uncertainty avoidance are more receptive to adopt climate policies that impose 
higher carbon prices and may impact negatively the economic growth in order to reduce 
emissions. As described before, low uncertainty avoidance societies embrace change 
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and seek new opportunities through innovation. From this perspective, low-uncertainty-
avoidance jurisdictions might be open to invest in new technologies such as clean 
energy and energy efficient technologies, like in the case of the Chinese provinces, 
which have invested US$ 2.9 trillion since 2004 in green energy sources, leading the 
way towards solar power (Frangoul, 2018). Moreover, Chinese ETS pilots are notable 
for their innovative allowance allocation and distribution methodologies that suit the 
local structural and economic conditions of the respective jurisdictions (Xiong, Shen, Qi, 
Price, & Ye, 2017), indicating flexibility in the design of those carbon-pricing instruments 
to meet particular requirements.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the jurisdictions with high Uncertainty avoidance 
values are Greece, Portugal, Ukraine, Belgium, and Poland. These jurisdictions, as 
opposed to Scandinavian countries, adopted carbon-pricing initiatives relatively late. As 
expected, Greece, Portugal, and Ukraine present increasing CO2 growth rates for the 
periods analyzed.   
Poland and Ukraine, two of the jurisdictions transitioning from the coal-era 
infrastructure, have imposed through carbon taxes the lowest carbon prices observed in 
this research (US$0.08/tonCO2 eq and US$ 0.02/tonCO2 eq, respectively). In the case 
of Ukraine, in 2011, it was reported that Ukrainians have one of the highest carbon 
intensities (CO2 emissions per GDP) in the world (IEA, 2017). In this regard, Frey (2017) 
found that in order for Ukraine to achieve its target emission reductions of 10% with 
respect to the emissions level of 2010, Ukraine needs to raise its carbon tax from 
US$0.02/tonCO2 eq to US$3.07/tonCO2 eq. Furthermore, she states that “the feasibility 
of such a carbon tax strongly depends on the power of the lobbying groups and the 
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overall political will” (Frey, 2017, p. 12), making an allusion of the role that cultural 
values play in such situations. On the other hand, at the EU level, Poland opposes more 
ambitious GHG reduction targets and the further development of climate change 
policies (Zelljadt, Velten, Prahl, Duwe, & Poblocka, 2014). In 2016, Poland’s Energy 
Minister Krzysztof Tchorzewski claimed that “building more efficient coal power plants 
will get us better results in cutting CO2 emissions than building renewable energy 
sources like wind or solar” (Zulinski, 2018, para. 5), which can be interpreted as a 
significant characteristic of high uncertainty avoiding cultures.  
In terms of findings, the results of this study show that the moderating effect of 
uncertainty avoidance on the relationship between carbon prices and economic growth 
is significant. Consequently, high uncertainty avoiding jurisdictions that are new to 
carbon-pricing instruments may be especially reluctant to adopt such technologies, in 
light of a potential negative impact on their economic growth. In this regard, the transfer 
of carbon-pricing technologies to other jurisdictions should consider their levels of 
uncertainty avoidance to prevent difficulties during the implementation.  
5.3. Impacts of carbon prices and cultural dimensions on CO2 emissions 
In the first stage of the regression analysis on the CO2 emissions growth rate, none of 
the control variables produced a significant relationship with the dependent variable. 
Although, these variables have explained about 5.5% of the CO2 emissions growth rate 
variable.  
The type of mechanism and type of jurisdiction variables remained insignificant in the 
three regression stages. The type of jurisdiction variable was expected to indicate that 
carbon pricing has been increasingly adopted at the subnational level, where local 
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authorities are developing and implementing climate  policies, and working to address 
climate change within their own jurisdictions as they have direct control of critical 
sources of emissions (Burch et al., 2014). Additionally, carbon revenue could be locally 
managed without the intervention of a federal government. This allows subnational 
jurisdictions to implement carbon-pricing measures that are suitable and specific to the 
local conditions, including cultural values, which might change from province to province 
within the same country. Evidently, the link between subnational jurisdictions and 
cultural values in carbon-pricing initiatives requires further research, mainly considering 
the lack of information for cultural values at the subnational level. For example, it’s 
relevant to highlight that the province of Québec in Canada is culturally different from 
the rest of the provinces (Berry & Kalin, 1995), and having their own ETS gives the local 
government more flexibility to address their particular environmental issues, which are 
certainly physically and culturally different from the ones in other provinces.  
Hypothesis 2 expected a negative relationship between the level of carbon prices and 
the CO2 emissions growth rate, but it wasn’t supported. The coefficients are small and 
close to zero; the direction of the relationship for the two regression stages were the 
opposite as expected and not statistically significant in the two regression stages where 
the variable carbon price was included. This result can be explained in a similar fashion 
that the lack of statistical significance of carbon prices was described for the GDP 
growth rate, indicating that explicit carbon prices have limitations in reflecting the 
impacts of non-carbon-pricing policies that reduce CO2 emissions such as performance 
standards and renewable portfolio standards (Flues & Lutz, 2015). Moreover, explicit 
carbon prices may be also limited in manifesting the influence of carbon-pricing 
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strategies such as carbon revenue recycling, which in many cases as shown in Table 1 
are used to reduce emissions and enhance policy efficiency. For instance, Quebec 
deposits its carbon tax revenue into a “green fund” that supports initiatives offering the 
largest projected reduction in, or avoidance of, GHGs (Sumner et al., 2009), and the 
RGGI also tends to direct most of its revenue to encourage energy savings (Tietenberg, 
2013).  
In the second stage of the regression, the hypothesis 4B was supported, indicating a 
significant and negative relationship between individualism and CO2. This relationship 
became insignificant in the last regression stage and remained in the expected 
direction. Nevertheless, this result suggests that individualistic societies provide self-
empowerment and individual responsibility toward climate change. This has critical 
implications about the suitability of climate policies in certain societies. For instance, 
climate policies should address collectivistic societies differently, indicating that a 
careless attitude toward climate change and its impacts could affect the interests of the 
in-group of business people and workers in the long run (Husted, 2005). Additionally, 
social acceptance and tradition are more important than self-respect in collectivistic 
countries (Hofstede, 1997). As a result, the adoption of renewable energies and energy-
efficient technologies, for example, must be presented to business people in 
collectivistic countries as corporate and socially acceptable.   
The jurisdictions with high individualism values are the U.S. subnational jurisdictions, 
Australia, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and the Canadian provinces. These 
jurisdictions have implemented innovative carbon-pricing instruments. For instance, the 
RGGI in the U.S. is notable for its transparency and commitment to periodic program 
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reviews to adjust its ETS market. RGGI is also known for full auctioning of its 
allowances, significant revenue generation ($2.7 billion so far), and investment of 
revenue towards other emissions-reducing activities (Tietenberg, 2013). By the same 
token, Canadian provinces have implemented ambitious carbon-pricing initiatives in 
British Columbia, Quebec, Alberta, and Ontario (World Bank & Ecofys, 2018). 
Nevertheless, U.S. and Canada have walked away from the Kyoto Protocol in the past, 
and the U.S. has also recently abandoned the Paris Accord. Also, in July 2018, the 
recently elected, Ontario’s Premier, Doug Ford, announced the ending of the Ontario’s 
cap-and-trade system (Rieti, 2018). Also, Australia in 2014 voted to cancel its national 
carbon tax initiative.  
As the caveats described in the literature review, these political events appear 
contradictory to the broad tendencies indicated in the hypotheses, but political leaders 
may make decisions opposing to society’s tendencies, meaning that in the long run it’s 
expected that the society’s preferences will prevail.     
On the other hand, the least individualistic jurisdictions are the Republic of Korea, the 
Chinese provinces, Ukraine, Slovenia, and Portugal, which as no surprise are among 
the jurisdictions that have increasing CO2 emissions growth rates. For example, the 
Korean ETS may face difficulties in achieving its NDC commitment of 37% emissions 
reductions below BAU by 2030, due to several reasons such as emissions leakage from 
noncompliance in the downstream electricity consumption; a lack of liquidity in the 
market; and the political nature of allowance allocations has reduced confidence in the 
system (Narassimhan et al., 2017). These difficulties may indicate that the carbon-
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pricing initiative faces complications to enter the political agenda, which may be 
indicative of a highly collectivistic jurisdiction.   
Finally, hypothesis 4C, which proposed that higher levels of Masculinity increase CO2 
emissions growth rate, is significant, but in the opposite direction as expected. Hence, 
the hypothesis was not supported. This result suggests that masculine jurisdictions 
have a tendency to present lower growth rates of CO2 emissions, which is the opposite 
that theory indicates, considering that societies with high values of masculinity prioritize 
material success over environmental conservation (Hofstede, 2001). An alternative 
explanation for this result is that while societies with high scores of masculinity may 
prioritize economic development over climate protection, masculine societies may be 
inclined to combat the environmental problems by coercion rather than consent, when 
CO2 emissions and climate change impacts reaches alarming levels (Husted, 2005).  
The jurisdictions with the highest values of masculinity included in this study are Japan, 
Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and Mexico, with a significant difference between Japan 
(score of 95 out of 100) and the rest of the jurisdictions.  
According to the explanation provided before, five decades ago Japan had serious air 
pollution problems. Emissions of nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide tripled during the 
1960s. Japan became known for pollution-related diseases named after the cities where 
they first appeared. As a result, they took drastic measures to reduce pollution, passing 
14 laws at once, what became known as the Pollution Diet of 1970 (Harney, 2013). 
Despite these past experiences, today Japan has a modest carbon tax rate of $3 per 
ton of CO2, which doesn’t seem to help the country in achieving its emissions reduction 
98 
 
goal of 26% below 2013 levels by 2020 (Narassimhan et al., 2017), and reflects the 
dominant masculine culture in the country.  
In the third stage of the regression, Uncertainty Avoidance became significant and 
positive, supporting Hypothesis 4D, which proposes that the lower levels of Uncertainty 
Avoidance, the lower levels of CO2 growth rate. This result suggests that Uncertainty 
Avoidance influences carbon emissions reductions. For instance, Sweden has achieved 
one the highest emission reductions (Lin & Li, 2011), and is among one of the 
jurisdictions with lowest Uncertainty Avoidance scores. This is derived from an 
aggressive policy to reduce emissions in the early 1990s, when the Nordic countries 
were pioneers in implementing carbon-pricing initiatives and enforced strict 
environmental laws.  
Finally, it’s important to highlight that cultural profiles of countries may be useful in 
predicting the adoption of carbon-pricing initiatives. For example, individualistic and low-
uncertainty-avoiding jurisdictions might be more propense to implement carbon-pricing 
initiatives than collectivistic-uncertainty-avoiding jurisdictions.  
These cultural profiles of jurisdictions are potentially a relevant factor in the trend of 
linking jurisdictions through carbon-pricing initiatives. For instance, the linkage between 
Quebec, California, and Ontario with different cultural backgrounds could reflect in the 
long-run the relevance of cultural values in such joint emission trading systems. 
Currently, Ontario, led by a new Premier, decided to cancel its cap-and-trade system, 
suggesting that the voters at that moment agreed on that decision during his campaign, 
which hasn’t happened in the case of Quebec or California since 2014. Measuring the 
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degree of influence that culture inflicts on such decisions is a major challenge, but 
evidence shows that there is a link between these factors. 
Knowing the cultural profiles of the countries won’t necessarily provide policymakers 
with tools to influence culture and induce behavior, but they would gear policymakers 
with a better understanding of the particularities and local conditions that enable a 
successful adoption and implementation of climate policies.      
5.4. Summary of hypotheses accepted/rejected 
Table 5. Hypotheses accepted/rejected  
Hypothesis Result 
H1. The higher the carbon price the lower the short-term GDP growth rate. Not supported 
H2. The higher the carbon prices, the lower the short-term growth rate of 
CO2 emissions. 
Not supported 
H3A. The lower the level of power distance in a jurisdiction, the higher the 
GDP’s growth rate. 
Not supported 
H4A. The higher the level of power distance in a jurisdiction, the higher the 
CO2 emissions’ growth rate 
Not supported 
H3B. The more individualistic a jurisdiction, the higher the GDP’s growth rate Not supported 
H4B. The more individualistic a jurisdiction, the lower the CO2 emissions’ 
growth rate. 
Supported 
H3C. The greater the masculinity of a jurisdiction, the higher the GDP’s   
growth rate. 
Not supported 
H4C. The greater the masculinity of a jurisdiction, the higher the CO2 
emissions’ growth rate. 
Not supported 
but significant 
H3D. The lower the uncertainty avoidance, the higher the GDP’s growth rate. Supported 
H4D. The lower the uncertainty avoidance, the lower the CO2 emissions’ 
growth rate. 
Supported 
H3E. A higher level of long-term orientation will produce a higher growth rate 
of the GDP.  
Not supported 
H4E. A higher level of long-term orientation will produce a lower growth rate 
of CO2 emissions. 
Not supported 
H3F. A higher level of indulgence will decrease the growth rate of GDP. Not supported 





H5A. Lower levels of power distance strengthen the negative relationship 
between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
Not supported 
H6A.The higher the level of power distance, the weaker the negative 
relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 emissions growth rate. 
Not supported 
H5B. The higher the level of individualism, the stronger the positive 
relationship between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
Not supported 
H6B. The higher the level of individualism, the stronger the inverse 
relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate.  
Not supported 
H5C.The higher the level of masculinity, the weaker the negative relationship 
between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
Not supported 
H6C.The lower the level of masculinity, the stronger the inverse relationship 
between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate 
Not supported 
H5D. The lower the level of uncertainty avoidance, the stronger the negative 
relationship between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate. 
Supported 
H6D. The higher the level of uncertainty avoidance, the weaker the inverse 
relationship between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate. 
Not supported 
H5E.The higher the level of long-term orientation, the weaker the relationship 
between carbon prices and the GDP growth rate. 
Not supported 
H6E. Lower levels of long-term orientation weakens the negative relationship 
between carbon prices and the CO2 growth rate.  
Not supported 
H5F. A high level of indulgence weakens an inverse relationship between 
carbon prices and the GDP growth rate.  
Not supported 
H6F. A low level of indulgence strengthens a negative relationship between 














Acknowledging the importance of cultural factors in climate policy is an important first 
step. Accordingly, the results of this study indicate that culture influences carbon prices, 
and consequently, economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions. These results are 
relevant findings for policymakers, who should consider culture as an important factor in 
developing and implementing climate policies. The relationships between the variables 
analyzed are complex, but they reveal that culture plays a role in the development of 
carbon-pricing instruments. Cultural values are hardly manipulated by policymakers as 
opposed to carbon prices that do change behavior. But considering cultural variability 
while developing climate policies, might constitute a significant difference between a 
successfully implemented policies and failed “well-intentioned” instruments.  
Including culture as a factor in the construction of carbon-pricing instruments remains a 
challenge, which should consider the appropriate scale to ensure its effective 
application. Potentially, smaller scales will require more efforts and resources, but are 
expected to have the desired outcomes.  
Carbon prices and the cultural dimensions were able to explain between 1.5% and 
67.3% of the variance in the real gross domestic product growth rate, with uncertainty 
avoidance and the interaction between carbon prices and uncertainty avoidance as the 
strongest significant predictors.  
Jurisdictions with low Uncertainty Avoidance levels have higher GDP growth rates, 
indicating that such jurisdictions are open to the adoption of new technologies and 
innovation, even when it implies small regressive impacts on economic growth in the 
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initial phases, like in the case of the carbon-pricing initiatives.  These results suggest 
that low Uncertainty Avoidance levels are relevant in the context of carbon pricing with 
respect to economic growth. Additionally, the negative effects of carbon-pricing 
instruments on the economy can be reverted with the implementation of carbon revenue 
management strategies, requiring a certain ability to manage adequately ambiguous 
economic conditions during the initial stages of its implementation, which is also in line 
with low uncertainty avoiding cultures.   
The moderating effect of Uncertainty Avoidance on carbon prices with respect to 
economic growth shows that high uncertainty avoiding jurisdictions are unwilling to 
increase carbon prices and adopt stricter climate instruments, considering the negative 
impacts that those instruments impose on their economies. This cultural distance is a 
useful indicator of the transferability of carbon-pricing technologies to other jurisdictions 
that prioritize economic growth over environmental performance.  
6.1. Contributions to theory 
The climate change debate has been dominated by the physical and economic 
sciences, but this study provides initial clues that culture plays a role in the development 
and implementation of carbon-pricing instruments, which have been widely adopted as 
mitigation tools. Nonetheless, more research is required to establish in detail to what 
extent the relationships between culture, carbon taxes and emissions trading systems 
influence climate policies. The contributions described below reflect those initial cues 
mentioned before.  
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Carbon prices and the cultural dimensions were able to explain between 5.5% and 
29.2% of the variance in the carbon dioxide emissions growth rate, with individualism, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance as the strongest significant predictors.  
Individualistic jurisdictions are more inclined to adopt climate policies to reduce 
emissions, which has critical implications in terms of the suitability and introduction of 
carbon-pricing instruments in certain jurisdictions. Nevertheless, several examples of 
the opposite exist, where highly individualistic jurisdictions abandon climate change 
agreements. These examples reflect political events where political leaders that at 
certain point make decisions opposing to society’s tendencies. But it is expected that in 
the long run the society’s preferences overcome those decisions. Moreover, it’s difficult 
to explain particular events from a cultural perspective with such a broad approach like 
in the case of the Hofstede’s framework. 
With respect to the results of the Masculinity cultural dimension, which are significant in 
the model but in the opposite direction as expected, reflect those masculine jurisdictions 
that normally prioritize economic growth over the environment, but they rapidly adapt 
their approach if the environmental conditions reach alarming levels that may threat 
productive activities in the long-run and prioritize environmental issues.   
The major constraint that this study had was the lack of cultural dimensions at the 
subnational level, limiting the understanding of the cultural nuances within countries and 
their different approaches with respect to carbon-pricing instruments and having an 
accurate perspective of the cultural profiles of jurisdictions at the subnational level.  
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6.2. Contributions to practice 
Jurisdiction’s cultural profiles could be a powerful tool that supports the development of 
culturally congruent carbon-pricing policies and facilitates the transferability of climate 
change policies among jurisdictions. This feature is critical in the near future, 
considering that linkage of jurisdictions is becoming rapidly important to achieve 
emissions reductions, because it can reduce costs substantially. Lower costs, in turn, 
may contribute politically to embracing more ambitious objectives (Mehling et al., 2018), 
and enhance the chances to achieve a global carbon price. Linkage of jurisdictions may 
be key in creating political momentum to move forward climate policies where they don’t 
exist, considering also that linkage is an entirely voluntary process. In this regard, 
cultural profiles are especially useful, considering that the Paris Agreement implies a 
large number of NDCs aiming to reduce emissions at the lowest cost possible, but also 
with big disparities in terms of capabilities and practical knowledge of carbon-pricing 
instruments, requiring transfer of technology. For instance, low uncertainty avoiding-
individualistic jurisdictions are more likely to join regional carbon-pricing initiatives than 
jurisdictions with a different cultural profile.   
Accordingly, culture might be a useful “soft” tool in the challenge of decarbonizing the 
environment. And acknowledging that carbon-pricing instruments that are effective in 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions in one jurisdiction may not be as effective or easily 
implemented in another due to cultural differences is a relevant improvement. 
Furthermore, because cultural values are rooted in societies and change slowly, the 
transferability and application of  climate policies from one society to another may be 
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very limited in the short-run (Disli et al., 2016), requiring locally designed modifications 
in order to ease implementation.  
Policymaking institutions should promote the development of culturally congruent 
incentives for addressing carbon dioxide emissions in the different jurisdictions, 
differentiating carbon-pricing instruments for different regions and subnational 
jurisdictions within countries. Also, future climate policy and global environmental 
initiatives that encourage sustainable development should incorporate the impacts of 
culture at the subnational, national, and regional level in the environment-economic 
growth nexus. 
6.3. Future research 
Future research could incorporate complementary policies and other carbon-pricing 
elements along with carbon prices in the analysis of impacts on economic growth and 
carbon dioxide emissions to provide a comprehensive perspective and an apples-to-
apples comparison between jurisdictions of those impacts. In order to achieve an 
adequate comparison, it is crucial to have information of cultural values at the 
subnational level.   
The role of culture with respect to the willingness-to-pay for carbon emissions 
reductions is another interesting topic that helps to understand potential difficulties for 
carbon pricing implementation across jurisdictions. Additionally, the role of culture in 
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Appendix A.  
 
49 carbon-pricing initiatives – national and subnational jurisdictions 
 
The cultural dimensions are on the right of each table. PD: Power distance; IND: 
Individualism; MAS: Masculinity; UNA: Uncertainty avoidance; LTO: Long-term 
orientation; and IVR: Indulgence versus restraint.   
 










Year of implementation 2007 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$15 
Share of emissions covered 45% 
Alberta’s carbon tax rate, launched in 2017, increased 
from CAN$20/tCO2e US$16/tCO2e) in 2017 to 
CAN$30/tCO2e (US$23/tCO2e) in 2018.  
Year of implementation 2007 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$14 
Share of emissions covered 50% 
The initiative has contracted 438 projects against a cost of 
A$2.28 billion (US$1.75 billion) to deliver 191 MtCO2e of 






































5. Beijing, China  
 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Key post-2020 reforms include changing the linear annual 
cap reduction from 1.74 per cent to 2.2 percent 
Year of implementation 2008 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 9.55 
Share of emissions covered 70% 
British Columbia’s tax rate increased from CAD$30/tCO2e 
to CAD$35/tCO2e (US$23/tCO2e to US$27/tCO2e) on 
April 1, 2018 and will continue to increase annually by 
CAD$5/tCO2e (US$4/tCO2e) until the rate is C$50/tCO2e 
(US$39/tCO2e) in 2021 
Year of implementation 2013 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism Pilot ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 8.20 
Share of emissions covered 45% 
A decrease in free allocation in the Beijing pilot ETS of up 
to ten percentage points for existing facilities in various 





















































Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Key post-2020 reforms include changing the linear annual 
cap reduction from 1.74 per cent to 2.2 percent 
Year of implementation 2012 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 10.00 
Share of emissions covered 85% 
Proposed modifications to the ETS include the 
establishment of a price ceiling, the allowance price 
containment reserve, free allocation, and the use of offsets 
Year of implementation 2014 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism Pilot ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 4.30 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Reduced the cap from 106 MtCO2e in 2015 to 100 




















































11. Delaware, United States 
 
 
Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
In 2021, the emissions cap will be 75 million short tons of 
CO2 per year. 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Key post-2020 reforms include changing the linear annual 
cap reduction from 1.74 per cent to 2.2 percent 
Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
The cap will decrease annually by approximately 3 percent, 
resulting in a 30 percent reduction in the cap in 2030 




















































Year of implementation 1992 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 17.00 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Per capita emissions were reduced by 15% from 1990 to 
2005. Industrial emissions were reduced by 23% during the 
1990s, after adjusting for growth and market-induced 
industry restructuring 
Year of implementation 2000 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 0.46 
Share of emissions covered 3% 
The environmental tax revenues of the Republic of Estonia 
totalled 5.9 billion kroons in 2007. 
Year of implementation 1990 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 17.50 
Share of emissions covered 36% 
From January 1, 2018, the carbon tax rate for coal, heavy 
fuel oil and light fuel oil was increased from €58/tCO2e to 



















































Year of implementation 2014 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 8.00 
Share of emissions covered 35% 
The new trajectory for the next four years involves an 
annual increase of €10.4 (US$13) from €44.6/tCO2e 
(US$55/tCO2e) in 2018 to €86.2/tCO2e (US$107/tCO2e) 
in 2022. 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
The proposed Effort Sharing Regulation, which sets 
binding emission reduction targets for sectors not covered 
by the EU ETS post-2020, is also under consideration.  
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Key post-2020 reforms include changing the linear annual 





















































Year of implementation 2013 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism Pilot ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 10.50 
Share of emissions covered 60% 
Benchmark values for the power sector in the Guangdong 
pilot was adjusted in 2017 to levels that are closer to the 
values published in the allocation plan for the national ETS. 
Year of implementation 2014 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism Pilot ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 9.90 
Share of emissions covered 35% 
The scope of the ETS increased in 2017 to cover all 
entities in the power and industry sectors with an energy 
consumption over 10,000 tons of standard coal equivalent 
in any year from 2014 to 2016. 
Year of implementation 2010 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 18.62 
Share of emissions covered 55% 
The Iceland carbon tax rate increased to approximately 




















































Year of implementation 2010 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 19.95 
Share of emissions covered 49% 
Introduced a carbon tax from most sectors not covered 
under the EU ETS; including transport, heat for residential 
sectors, commercial buildings, and small industry. 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Post-2020, the share of allowances to be auctioned is set 
at 57%, but can be lowered by up to 3% to avoid the 
triggering of the cross-sectoral correction factor. 
Year of implementation 2012 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 2.00 
Share of emissions covered 68% 
It’s notable for its efficient use of revenue towards low 
carbon technologies and energy efficiency. In 2016, the 
















































26. Maine, United States 
 
Year of implementation 2004 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 1.17 
Share of emissions covered 15% 
The carbon tax increased from €3.5/tCO2 (US$4/tCO2) in 
2016 to €4.5/tCO2(US$5/tCO2) in 2017.The carbon 
revenue is used for environmental protection, including 
climate change measures. 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Post-2020, the share of allowances to be auctioned is set 
at 57%, but can be lowered by up to 3% to avoid the 
triggering of the cross-sectoral correction factor. 
Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
The cap will decrease annually by approximately 3 percent, 
resulting in a 30 percent reduction in the cap in 2030 



















































Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
The ECR will curb any oversupply of allowances from 2021 
onward. States participating in RGGI will now start their 
state-specific processes to bring these changes into effect. 
Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
On January 1, 2018, Massachusetts launched its ETS, 
which directly covers power plants. The ETS is a cap-and-
trade system, with a cap that will decline annually by 2.5 
percent until emissions reach 1.8 MtCO2 in 2050. 
Year of implementation 2014 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 3.50 
Share of emissions covered 46% 
On December 12, 2017, the Mexican Lower Chamber of 
Congress approved amendments to the General Law on 
Climate Change, establishing the mandate to design and 



















































32. New York, United States 
 
 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
On October 10, 2017, the government announced the 
introduction of a carbon floor price for electricity generators 
covered under the EU ETS, including facilities in the power 
sector and other autogeneration facilities. 
Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
The number of states participating in the RGGI allowance 
market may be increased to eleven by 2020. 
Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
On August 23, 2017, the US states participating in RGGI 
reached an agreement on the draft design elements of 



















































Year of implementation 2008 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 9.63 
Share of emissions covered 51% 
In May 2016 initiated a phase out of the one-for-two 
measure, which allowed non-forestry ETS facilities to 
surrender 1 emission allowance for every 2 tons of CO2e. 
Year of implementation 1991 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 18.00 
Share of emissions covered 60% 
On January 1, 2018, the full carbon tax rate in Norway 
increased to NOK500/tCO2e (US$64/tCO2e), and most 
exemptions and reduced carbon tax rates were abolished. 
Year of implementation 1990 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 0.08 
Share of emissions covered 4% 
In 2012, Poland priced 75% of carbon emissions from 
energy use, and 16% were priced above EUR 30 per tonne 

















































38. Republic of Korea 
 
Year of implementation 2015 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 5.00 
Share of emissions covered 29% 
To decarbonize the Portuguese economy, energy tax 
exemptions for coal-fired electricity generation and co-
generation facilities are gradually being abolished. 
Year of implementation 2013 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 11.46 
Share of emissions covered 85% 
In November 2017, the government adopted legislation to 
prepare its ETS for the post-2020 period, including rules for 
free allocation of emission allowance from 2021-2023140 
and the cap for 2021-2030. 
Year of implementation 2015 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 10.00 
Share of emissions covered 68% 
In January 1, 2018, the ETS entered its second phase until 
2020. An emissions cap of 538.5 MtCO2e will apply in 




















































Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
On August 23, 2017, the US states participating in RGGI 
reached an agreement on the draft design elements of 
RGGI for the period after 2020. 
Year of implementation 2013 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism Pilot ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 4.43 
Share of emissions covered 57% 
Benchmark values for the power sector were adjusted in 
2017 to levels closer to the draft allocation plan for the 
national ETS.  Lowered the limit for CCER usage for 
compliance in 2017 from 5% of annual emissions to 1%. 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Post-2020, the share of allowances to be auctioned is set 
at 57%, but can be lowered by up to 3% to avoid the 


















































44. Switzerland  
 
Year of implementation 2005 
Type of jurisdiction Regional 
Type of mechanism EU ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 31.33 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
In August 2017 the Catalonian Law on Climate Change 
was adopted, aiming to implement a carbon tax in 2019, 
which will apply to GHG emissions from large installations 
in the power industry, agriculture, and waste sectors, 
including EU ETS installations. 
Year of implementation 1991 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 45.00 
Share of emissions covered 40% 
Starting from July 1, 2018, Sweden introduced an emission 
reduction obligation scheme for petrol and diesel to 
promote low blending of biofuels, and previously exempted 
combined heat and power plants covered by the EU ETS 
are being taxed 11% of the full tax rate. 
Year of implementation 2008 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 39.00 
Share of emissions covered 33% 
In January 1, 2018 the tax went from US$88/tCO2e to 
US$101/tCO2e, after the government found that its GHG 














































46. Tianjin, China  
 
 
47. United Kingdom 
 
Year of implementation 2008 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 42.00 
Share of emissions covered 11% 
The first phase, from 2008–2012, was voluntary for firms 
wanting to be exempt from the CO2 levy.  In the latest 
phase, 2013–2020, it imposes an economy-wide emissions 
cap, mandatory enrollment for large entities, a combination 
of free and auctioned allowances with auctioning set to 
increase to 70% by 2020. 
Year of implementation 2013 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism Pilot ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 4.45 
Share of emissions covered 55% 
Extended the legal provisions to govern its pilot ETS to 
June 30, 2018. 
Year of implementation 2013 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 15.75 
Share of emissions covered 23% 
From 2021, the government will target a “total carbon price 
rate” that will apply to businesses; the format of this rate is 
yet to be defined.  Further details on carbon pricing in the 































































Year of implementation 2011 
Type of jurisdiction National 
Type of mechanism Carbon tax 
Price at implementation US$ 0.02 
Share of emissions covered 71% 
Ukraine plans to establish a national ETS in line with its 
obligations under the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, 
which entered into force on September 1, 2017 
Year of implementation 2009 
Type of jurisdiction Subnational 
Type of mechanism RGGI ETS 
Price at implementation US$ 3.07 
Share of emissions covered 21% 
On August 23, 2017, the US states participating in RGGI 
reached an agreement on the draft design elements of 










































Appendix B.  
 
Paired difference T- test  
 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 CO2_post 177.096218408 49 222.991968478
4 
31.5358266122 
CO2_pre 183.878793807 49 226.257090325
9 
31.9975845722 














Paired Samples Correlations 
 N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 CO2_post & CO2_pre 49 .997 .000 















95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 






-12.005159 -1.5599914856 -2.610 48 .012 






















Cut- off points for values: 
 
Mahalanobis distance  
 
(Chi square) X2 degrees of freedom => p<.001 
 






























N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Unstandardized Residual 49 -.043 .337 -.263 .662 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 34.738 16 2.171 1.508 .156b 
Residual 47.514 32 1.440   
Total 82.251 48    
a. Dependent Variable: gdp 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CP*IDLG centered, Power distance, Uncertainty avoidance, Carbon 
price at implementation, CP*MAS centered, CP*UNA centered, Masculinity, CP*PD centered, 
CP*LTO centered, Long term orientation, Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), CP*IND centered, 
Indulgence, Type of jurisdiction (National=0; subnational=1), Individualism 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.8352 2.9643 1.0000 .84198 49 
Residual -2.75850 2.58514 .00000 .98472 49 
Std. Predicted Value -2.180 2.333 .000 1.000 49 
Std. Residual -2.299 2.154 .000 .821 49 
a. Dependent Variable: gdp 
 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 





  34.7377 
 
Residual SS 





  82.2514 
 
R-squared 
    .4223 
 
Sample size (N) 
   49 
 
Number of predictors (P) 
   16 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroscedasticity (CHI-SQUARE df=P) 
   17.369 
 
Significance level of Chi-square df=P (H0: homoscedasticity) 
    .3621 
 
Koenker test for Heteroscedasticity (CHI-SQUARE df=P) 
   21.117 
 
Significance level of Chi-square df=P (H0: homoscedasticity) 
    .1741 
 
Fail to reject null hypothesis.  
 























N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Unstandardized Residual 49 .028 .340 .871 .668 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .412a .170 -.245 1.83999 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CP*IVR centered, Carbon price at 
implementation times coverage, Uncertainty avoidance, Long term 
orientation, CP*MAS centered, CP*PD centered, Masculinity, CP*LTO 
centered, Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), CP*IND centered, 
CP*UNA centered, Type of jurisdiction (National=0; subnational=1), 
Indulgence, Individualism, Power distance 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.213 16 1.388 .410 .969b 
Residual 108.338 32 3.386   
Total 130.551 48    
a. Dependent Variable: CO2 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CP*IVR centered, Carbon price at implementation times coverage, 
Uncertainty avoidance, Long term orientation, CP*MAS centered, CP*PD centered, Masculinity, 
CP*LTO centered, Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), CP*IND centered, CP*UNA centered, 




 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.3704 2.6696 1.0000 .68028 49 
Residual -2.15609 5.60178 .00000 1.50234 49 
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Std. Predicted Value -2.014 2.454 .000 1.000 49 
Std. Residual -1.172 3.044 .000 .816 49 
a. Dependent Variable: CO2 
 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 














    .1702 
 
Sample size (N) 
   49 
 
Number of predictors (P) 
   16 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroscedasticity (CHI-SQUARE df=P) 
   11.107 
 
Significance level of Chi-square df=P (H0: homoscedasticity) 
    .8029 
 
Koenker test for Heteroscedasticity (CHI-SQUARE df=P) 
    8.337 
 
Significance level of Chi-square df=P (H0: homoscedasticity) 
    .9382 
 
Fail to reject null hypothesis 
 








Linear regression analyses  
 

















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .237a .056 .015 .113008 .056 1.364 2 46 .266 
2 .815b .663 .586 .073277 .607 10.058 7 39 .000 
3 .880c .775 .673 .065108 .112 2.734 6 33 .029 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; 
subnational=1) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; 
subnational=1), Indulgence, Masculinity, Carbon price at implementation times coverage, Uncertainty 
avoidance, Individualism, Long term orientation, Power distance 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; 
subnational=1), Indulgence, Masculinity, Carbon price at implementation times coverage, Uncertainty 
avoidance, Individualism, Long term orientation, Power distance, CP*MAS centered, CP*LTO centered, 
CP*PD centered, CP*IVR centered, CP*IND centered, CP*UNA centered 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .035 2 .017 1.364 .266b 
Residual .587 46 .013   
Total .622 48    
2 Regression .413 9 .046 8.544 .000c 
Residual .209 39 .005   
Total .622 48    
3 Regression .482 15 .032 7.587 .000d 
Residual .140 33 .004   
Total .622 48    
a. Dependent Variable: Growth rate real GDP 
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b. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; 
subnational=1) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; 
subnational=1), Indulgence, Masculinity, Carbon price at implementation times coverage, 
Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism, Long term orientation, Power distance 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; 
subnational=1), Indulgence, Masculinity, Carbon price at implementation times coverage, 
Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism, Long term orientation, Power distance, CP*MAS centered, 









Coefficients t Sig. Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta   Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .051 .027  1.906 .063      
Type of 
jurisdiction  
.033 .039 .142 .845 .403 .209 .124 .121 .730 1.370 
Type of 
mechanism  
.030 .039 .130 .774 .443 .203 .113 .111 .730 1.370 
2 (Constant) .246 .119  2.071 .045      
Type of 
jurisdiction  
-.003 .042 -.013 -.073 .942 .209 -.012 -.007 .262 3.816 
Type of 
mechanism  
.033 .031 .139 1.057 .297 .203 .167 .098 .497 2.013 
Carbon price  .001 .003 .065 .522 .605 -.051 .083 .048 .557 1.797 
Individualism -.001 .001 -.265 -1.508 .140 -.588 -.235 -.140 .279 3.590 
Masculinity .000 .001 -.035 -.304 .763 .073 -.049 -.028 .636 1.573 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
-.002 .001 -.415 -2.906 .006 -.266 -.422 -.270 .422 2.368 
Long term 
orientation 
.001 .001 .189 1.174 .247 .618 .185 .109 .332 3.009 
Indulgence -.002 .001 -.277 -1.753 .087 -.599 -.270 -.163 .345 2.897 
Power 
distance 
.001 .001 .186 1.004 .322 .507 .159 .093 .252 3.963 
3 (Constant) .150 .130  1.152 .258      
Type of 
jurisdiction  





.003 .032 .012 .089 .929 .203 .016 .007 .361 2.768 
Carbon price  -.001 .003 -.032 -.233 .817 -.051 -.041 -.019 .362 2.766 
Individualism -.001 .001 -.134 -.705 .486 -.588 -.122 -.058 .190 5.276 
Masculinity -.001 .001 -.136 -1.143 .261 .073 -.195 -.094 .480 2.081 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
-.002 .001 -.388 -2.534 .016 -.266 -.404 -.209 .290 3.451 
Long term 
orientation 
.001 .001 .248 1.551 .130 .618 .261 .128 .266 3.765 
Indulgence .000 .001 -.034 -.200 .842 -.599 -.035 -.017 .234 4.272 
Power 
distance 
.002 .001 .257 1.266 .214 .507 .215 .105 .166 6.028 
CP*PD 
centered 
-.008 .021 -.054 -.357 .723 -.146 -.062 -.029 .296 3.380 
CP*IND 
centered 
.018 .021 .135 .866 .393 .386 .149 .071 .279 3.579 
CP*MAS 
centered 
.021 .012 .197 1.685 .102 .202 .281 .139 .500 1.999 
CP*UNA 
centered 
.040 .018 .367 2.284 .029 .308 .369 .188 .264 3.794 
CP*LTO 
centered 
-.021 .017 -.154 -1.251 .220 -.453 -.213 -.103 .449 2.229 
CP*IVR 
centered 
.003 .017 .026 .177 .861 .264 .031 .015 .316 3.166 




 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.06779 .34784 .08284 .100251 49 
Residual -.111054 .139313 .000000 .053984 49 
Std. Predicted Value -1.503 2.643 .000 1.000 49 
Std. Residual -1.706 2.140 .000 .829 49 
























Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .307a .094 .055 .077535 .094 2.393 2 46 .103 
2 .622b .387 .245 .069286 .293 2.658 7 39 .024 
3 .716c .513 .292 .067125 .126 1.425 6 33 .235 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; subnational=1) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; subnational=1), 
Indulgence, Masculinity, Carbon price at implementation times coverage, Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism, 
Long term orientation, Power distance 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Type of mechanism (Tax=0; ETS=1), Type of jurisdiction (National=0; subnational=1), 
Indulgence, Masculinity, Carbon price at implementation times coverage, Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism, 
Long term orientation, Power distance, CP*MAS centered, CP*LTO centered, CP*PD centered, CP*IVR 
centered, CP*IND centered, CP*UNA centered 













B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.003 .018  -.175 .862      
Type of 
jurisdiction  
-.035 .027 -.217 -1.321 .193 -.286 -.191 -.185 .730 1.370 
Type of 
mechanism  
-.022 .027 -.132 -.804 .426 -.245 -.118 -.113 .730 1.370 
2 (Constant) .093 .112  .831 .411      
Type of 
jurisdiction  
.037 .040 .227 .926 .360 -.286 .147 .116 .262 3.816 
Type of 
mechanism  
-.010 .029 -.059 -.330 .743 -.245 -.053 -.041 .497 2.013 
Carbon price  .002 .002 .146 .871 .389 .235 .138 .109 .557 1.797 
Individualism -.002 .001 -.517 -2.177 .036 -.419 -.329 -.273 .279 3.590 





.001 .001 .225 1.166 .251 .192 .184 .146 .422 2.368 
Long term 
orientation 
.001 .001 .209 .960 .343 .322 .152 .120 .332 3.009 
Indulgence .000 .001 .035 .165 .870 -.284 .026 .021 .345 2.897 
Power 
distance 
-.001 .001 -.311 -1.247 .220 .148 -.196 -.156 .252 3.963 
3 (Constant) .033 .134  .248 .805      
Type of 
jurisdiction  
.077 .042 .477 1.858 .072 -.286 .308 .226 .224 4.463 
Type of 
mechanism  
-.008 .033 -.050 -.246 .807 -.245 -.043 -.030 .361 2.768 
Carbon price  .000 .003 .025 .121 .904 .235 .021 .015 .362 2.766 
Individualism -.001 .001 -.313 -1.122 .270 -.419 -.192 -.136 .190 5.276 
Masculinity -.002 .001 -.477 -2.724 .010 -.368 -.429 -.331 .480 2.081 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
.002 .001 .506 2.241 .032 .192 .363 .272 .290 3.451 
Long term 
orientation 
.001 .001 .302 1.280 .209 .322 .217 .155 .266 3.765 
Indulgence .000 .001 .098 .391 .698 -.284 .068 .048 .234 4.272 
Power 
distance 
-.002 .001 -.541 -1.815 .079 .148 -.301 -.220 .166 6.028 
CP*PD 
centered 
-.007 .022 -.069 -.310 .759 -.275 -.054 -.038 .296 3.380 
CP*IND 
centered 
.039 .022 .413 1.798 .081 .431 .299 .218 .279 3.579 
CP*MAS 
centered 
.001 .013 .014 .084 .934 .055 .015 .010 .500 1.999 
CP*UNA 
centered 
.012 .018 .152 .641 .526 -.078 .111 .078 .264 3.794 
CP*LTO 
centered 
-.032 .017 -.335 -1.846 .074 -.374 -.306 -.224 .449 2.229 
CP*IVR 
centered 
-.020 .018 -.244 -1.128 .267 .302 -.193 -.137 .316 3.166 








 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.13277 .07651 -.03051 .057122 49 
Residual -.142873 .151768 .000000 .055657 49 
Std. Predicted Value -1.790 1.874 .000 1.000 49 
Std. Residual -2.128 2.261 .000 .829 49 
a. Dependent Variable: Growth rate CO2 
 
 
